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CHAPTER I 
MIDDLE-ROAD ECONOMY 
After this second world war will come peace. Soldiers re-
leased from the armies will seek civilian jobs again. Fac-
tories which are building tanks will go back to building 
trucks and tractors. Factories making rifles will return to 
making washing machines or vacuum cleaners. The nations of the 
world will face the difficult problems of twisting their econ-
omic life from a war pattern to a peace pattern. These prob-
lems are especially acute for the large industrial nations; 
they are especially acute for America. 
When the pressing war needs are over, then America will 
have to decide what sort of industrial economy she is to have. 
We shall have three general roads before us: the right; the 
left; and the middle. If we choose the road to the right, we 
shall choose the old laissez-faire economy of, let us say, the 
1880's before the Sherman Anti-trust Act. This is unthinkable. 
Or perhaps it might be some milder gradation of "comparatively" 
laissez-faire economy, such as we had in the 1920's, with only 
a ~ alphabet commissions attempting to direct business from 
Washington. It seems very unlikely that we shall take this 
road to the right. First, because the resulting industrial 
anarchy seemed unable to give us economic security, and power-
less to protect us from depressions. Secondly, because the 
1 
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war-intrenched New Deal will doubtless be unwilling to~make 
the sacrifice of its alphabet bureaus that would be necessary 
for a return to the pre-New Deal status of the 1920's. The 
road to the right seems an unwise choice even if it were pos-
sible. In this booklet, we do not attempt to prove that this 
road can only lead to failure. We take it for granted. 
The road to the left also lies before us. It will mean 
a permanent New Deal with wartime powers projected into peace 
time; with a permanent peace production board, a permanent 
office of price administration, a permanent and powerful grip 
on business by Washington burocracy. It will mean state Social-
ism. Private property will continue. Even the large key in-
dustries such as steel, will continue to be owned by private 
stockholders. Practically, however, the total control over 
these industries will be in the hands of the government. The 
government will dictate prices at which the goods may be sold, 
the volume and quality to be produced, the types of products 
to be introduced or withdra~~ from the market. The government 
will control labor, dictating where and when it may work, for 
what wages, at what hours, under what conditions. Now while 
we are at war doubtless we need this form of State Socialism 
in order that our entire industry may be coordinated into one 
gigantic war effort. At any rate, we have it. And it seems 
to work. Not a few social planners proclaim that this social-
istic road to the left 1s the only wartime road, and the only 
peacetime road ~or America to ~ollo.. They say: A~t~ the 
war, go le~t. 
But·State Socialism cannot help us as a permanent measure. 
It will lead us dangerously close to Totalitarianism; it will 
plunge us in the quicksands o~ burocratic ine~~iciency; it may 
well imperil the rights o~ the individual; it will probably 
. 
stagnate business initiative which is so necessary in our dy-
namic economic order; it will take over ~ctions which can 
better be per~ormed by smaller groups than the state. It will 
surely ~ail to bring us lasting economic security and liberty. 
We do not prove here that the road to the le~t can only lead 
to ~ailure; that would require another booklet; we simply take 
it ~or granted as provable elsewhere. 
We propose in this booklet a third road for the govern-
ment o~ America's business a~ter the war. It is neither a 
road to the right nor a road to the le~t; it is the middle 
road. It is the Popes' Plan for Industrial Democracy. Indus-
trial Democracy means the sel~ government o~ industry by organ-
ic, vertical, vocational groups o~ labor and management subject 
to the political state. We call Industrial Democracy the 
middle road because it excludes the old rugged individualism 
and business anarcby o~ the right, and because it excludes the 
super-imposed, burocratic control of the huge political 
machine, o~ the le~t. Since it is ~ounded upon organic voca-
tional groups, it is closer to, and more able to protect the 
4 
individual than the state is close to him and able to protect 
~ 
him. Since it is founded upon these groups it is better able 
to lead the individual and force him if necessary, to cooper-
ate for the good of the vocational group and the entire econ-
omic order. The old rugged individualism was unable to effect 
cooperation for the common good. Industrial Democracy is 
neither excessively individualistic, nor is it totalitarian. 
It is the middle road. 
Since this thesis treats Industrial Democracy, it will 
not specifically treat any political system, either interna-
tional or national. It will not treat global politics, an 
international league, an international police force, or an in-
ternational economic planning board regulating markets and 
access to raw materials, even though these institutions would 
very much affect an' Industrial Democracy within any one nation 
such as America. It would expand this project beyond workable 
measure to treat these problems here. Moreover we shall not 
treat national political problems, at least to the extent that 
they are purely political. Thus we do not concern ourselves 
as to whether a republic might be a better form of government 
than an aristocracy or a monarchy. However, there is one 
political fact which is vitally necessary if our Industrial 
Democracy is to work well; namely, political Democracy. that 
is, we should have a political system in which the power is 
recognized to be radicated in the people by God, whether that 
5 
power expresses itself through representatives, "blue.ploods", 
or a monarch. Thus any form of Totalitariansm which claims 
to be the source of civil rights makes Industrial Democracy 
impossible. 
Secondly, we shall not treat specifically any problems 
of economic recovery or stability. We shall not discuss 
whether or not prices should be forced up or down, or questions 
of wages, interest, rents or profits, or questions of business 
cycles, of gold, of banking, of strikes. Nor shall we discuss 
the problem of competition versus monopoly. That problem is 
always with us - with or without the vocational group system. 
Hence it requires separate treatment. 
What we~ treating in this Thesis is the machinery for 
solving these problems of economic recovery and stability. 
We believe that the best machinery is Industrial Democracy. 
We ask: Do the principles of ethics, political science and 
economics provide us with a plan for a better organization of 
our business life than the one we now have? Can these prin-
ciples be applied to practical life? We answer to both ques-
tions: Yes. We are discussing the feasibility and desirabil-
ity of an economic quasi~state within the political state.' 
We are not treating the~onomic problems which our economic 
quasi-state will have to meet once it is set up. We are simplT 
asking whether it can, and ought to be set up in the first 
place. 
We are well aware of the many obstacles in the war of 
establishing Industrial Democracy in America - obstacles such 
as a huge national debt, the need for planned tood production 
immediately after the war, the fact that when powers have 
6 
been once granted to the government it is desperately hard to 
withdraw them, etc. We believe that an Industrial Democracy 
can be attained, but not overnight, and not without education, 
propaganda and study. We shall not treat here - except in 
passing - ways and means of actually "selling" Industrial Dem-
ocracy to the American people. However we shall treat many 
difficulties which the social "salesman" as well as the social 
engineer must know something about. The importance, there-
fore, of attaining a midd~e road solution, especially for those 
who have the Christian concept of society, can hardly be over-
estimated. As Wilfrid Parsons, S.J. recently put it: 
It seems to me that ••• we may be approaching 
the reason for the admitted impotence of 
the Church in the modern world. We are al-
ways allowing ourselves to be caught on the 
horns of a dilemma. Once it was either cap-
italism or socialism. Again it was either 
Fascism or Communism. And so on. Both 
sides conspire in saying we have no choice. 
The traditional murmur of the Church, "datur 
tertium", is urbanely smiled away ••• 
But the very existence, humanly speaking, of 
the Church depends on our maintaining that 
"tertium", that middle way.(Catholics) can-
not go to the Right, for that way lies ob-
livion, as in the past. We cannot go to 
the Left, for that way lies destruction. 
Our whole temporal salvation, and that of 
SOCiety, depends on our being able to estab.-
lish our middle course ••• 
The time is running out. Even now the 
collectivists and the individualists are 
entrenChing themselves, creating a situa~ 
tion which will exclude us. Both of them 
are in strategic positions in our Govern-
ment, and in governments everywhere, and 
they are planning for the post-war world. 
They are already telling us we have to 
chose between them ••• 
7 
While it is true that Catholic thinkers, such as Bishop 
von Ketteler, Popes Leo XIII, Pius XI and Pius XII have brought 
to light principles for a middle road solution, it is also true 
that these principles have not been adequately applied to 
practical life; they have remained "up in the air", in the 
realm of mere principles. Therefore they have made but little 
impact upon modern non-Catholic and even Catholic leaders. 
Thus in this booklet we shall endeavor to apply in a practical 
way the Popes' Plan for Industrial Democracy to a large, indus-
trial nation, the United States. We shall not write an actual 
blueprint for the future. However, we shall examine what we 
believe to be the only "flesh and blood" experiment in any 
modern, industrial nation of a plan closely approaching the 
Popes' Plan; namely, our own National Recovery Administration 
of 1933-5. Thus we transfer from the realm of principle to 
the realm of practice. We ask: What can the NRA tell us 
I W11f;id Parsons, S.J., "Blueprint for Catholics for 1943", 
America, Jan. 2, '43, 342. 
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about Industrial Democracy in a Eractical way? What4Warnings 
can it give us? What inspirations and suggestions ror a fu-
ture blueprint? Our field of treatment, therefore, is Indus-
trial Democracy and the NRA. 
What is a brief chart of the course we shall travel 
through this booklet? First, we shall examine in some detail 
the principles of Industrial Democracy, or the Corporative 
Society, as proposed by the Popes, especially as found tn 
"Quadragesimo Anno" and "Divini Redemptoris". Secondly, we 
shall examine the NRA, giving a brief descriptive history of 
the Recovery Act and the Recovery Administration. Then we 
shall consider two general problems which the NRA uncovers 
for us. The problem of vocational group unity - whether or 
not there are, or can be vocational groups with a real bond of 
unity making them into big "families" - whether or not these 
groups can be effectively delimited one from another. And 
the problem of vocational group government - what sort of 
legislation should evoke these groups? What sort of 19isla-
tion can, and should, these groups pass for their own regula-
tion? Who did govern these groups under the NRA? Who should 
govern them? 
Finally in our summary and conclusion, we shall claim 
that a vocationally organized society is possible in a modern 
industrial nation, that a very flexible type of blueprint is 
desirable because of the great differences between the various 
9 
vocational groups, that the system should not be imposed from 
above, that it cannot be created over night by the stroke of 
a pen, but rather that it must evolve, with the initiative 
coming from management and labor as much as possible. 
CHAPTER II 
INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY DEFINED 
What is the Pope's Plan for Industrial Democracy? Catho-
lic students are not in agreement upon a satisfactory English 
title for the Pope's new order. It has been called the Corpor-
ative State, the Corporative Society, Corporatism, Solidarism, 
Sodalism, the Vocational Society, the Occupational Society, etc. 
We reject here the title Corporative State as too redolent of 
Italian Facism. This was certainly not the Pope's plan, as Fr. 
Nell-Bruening well points out.~ For the same reason we reject 
Corporatism and the Corporate Society. The other titles men-
tioned above we reject since we believe they are not sufficient-
ly "salable" to the American public. We choose Industrial Dem-
ocracy2 as a title readily palatable to Americans, clearly 
1 
2 
Oswald Von Nell-Bruening, S.J., "Reorganization of Social 
Economy" transl. by Bernard W. Dempsey, S.J., Bruce, M1lwau-
k~e, 1936, 254-8. 
The title "Industrial Democracy" certainly does present dif-
ficulties. It seems to exclude the professions such as in-
dependent lawyers, engineers, doctors, accountants, etc. In 
the ideal corporative order such as the Pope's Plan, these 
professions would be represented. However, we have no bette! 
title than Industrial Democracy at hand. If it seems to ex-
clude the professions we shall simply have to explain to the 
professions that they are not excluded. 
Moreover, our title seems to exclude agriculture. 
Again we shall have to explain. Just how the farmers are to 
be included in our plan of industrial self-government, we do 
not say. The NRA kept hands off the farmers since the AAA 




~ Suggestive of the Pope's idea, and not yet too encumbered with 
connotations contrary to the Pope's idea. However we do not 
hold on to our title too strenuously. The idea behind it is 
the important thing. We would be glad to exchange our title 
for a better one, even for one of those rejected above, if good 
reasons were to dictate it. 
We are concerned in this booklet primarily wrth the Pope's 
plan as presented in the encyclical "Quadragesimo Anno", using 
this presentation as a basis and a starting point. The Pope 
does not use the term Industrial Democracy; he does say that 
the social order must be reconstructed on the basis of vocation-
al groups, "ordines". After treating the evils respectively of 
excessive Individualism and excessive Collectivism, and after 
enunciating his famous Principle of Subsidiarity, the Pope goes 
on to say; 
Now this is the primary duty of the 
State and of all good citizens; to abolish 
conflict between classes with divergent in-
terests, and thus foster and promote harmony 
between the various ranks of SOCiety. 
The aim of social legislation must there-
fore be the re-establishment of vocational 
groups. Society today still remains in a 
strained and therefore unstable and uncer-
tain state, being founded on classes with 
contradictory interests and hence opposed to 
each other, and gonsequently prone to en-
mity and strife. 
3--N~ii:Bruen1ng, 423, "Quadragesimo Anno", Nos. 81,82 
The Pope goes on to delineate in greater detail what h~ means 
by "classes" and "vocational groups". 
Labor, indeed, as has been well said 
by Our Predecessor in his Encyclical, is 
not a mere chattel, since the human dignity 
of the working man must be recognized in it, 
and consequently it cannot be bought and sold 
like any piece of merchandise. None the 
less, the demand and supply of labor divides 
men on the labor market into two classes, 
as into two camps, and the bargaining be-
tween these parties transforms this labor 
market into an arena where the two armies 
are engaged in combat. To this grave dis-
order, which is leading society to ruin, a 
remedy must evidently be applied as spped-
ily as possiBle. But there cannot be ques-
tion of any perfect cure, except this op-
position be done away with, and well-ordered 
members of the social body come into being 
anew, vocational groups, namely, binding 
men together not according to the position 
they occupy in the labor market, but accord-
ing to the diverse functions which they ex-
ercise in SOCiety. For as nature induces 
those who dwell in close proximity to unite 
into municipalities, so those who practice 
the same trade or profeSSion, economic or 
otherWise, combine into vocational groups. 
These groups, in a true sense autonomous, 
are considered by many to be, if not essen-
tial to civil society, at least4its natur-al and spontaneous development. 
Thus the Pope seems to say that management and labor op-
posing each other in the arena of the labor market are there-
fore two contradictory classes and always prone to enmity and 
strife. A society built upon these two OPPOSing forces is in 
grave disorder and is speeding to ruin. The only correction 
4-------




of this grave disorder is the doing away with this opposition 
by reconstructing society on a vocational group basis. 
Does the Pope mean that management and labor as such must 
be done away with? Does he mean that in his ideal order there 
must be one class: "managerial labor", in which all members 
of the vocational group will share in the management of the 
various companies (at least by remote control) as well as shar-
ing in the labor to be done? Does he go further and say that 
there can be no division within the vocational groups between 
those who ~ the means of production and those who do not, but 
that there must be one class only, every member of which is a 
part owner of the means of production? 
We do not believe the Pope means all this. Nevertheless, 
we believe that Section 83 of "Quadragesimo Anno", if taken 
in isolation, leaves much in the way of clarity to be deSired, 
and might well lead to misunderstandings. In this section, the 
Pope might seem to say implicitly that labor must be done away 
with. Then we ask: Would it be possible to do away with the 
opposition between management and labor without making labor a 
manager-ownerj merely by some sort of new cooperation as within 
a joint council within the vocational groups? The Pope might 
seem to say that this is impossible for he says "the demand and 
supply of labor divides men on the labor market into two class-
eS ••• (like) ••• two armies engaged in combat ••• " Therefore it 
might seem that the very fact that some men are offering their 
15 
but rather submerged, or redistributed, into vocationa1 groups. 
But does not the Pope say that the very existence of a 
labor market implies a fundamental split in society? Yes. But, 
when the Pope says labor market, he means a) a market in which 
labor is treated as a mere commodity, and b) a market upon 
whose two contending sides society is founded. The labor mar-
ket, taken in this sense, must go. But the Pope cannot be in-
terpreted to mean here that collective bargaining and the wage 
contract must.go if these recognize the dignity of labor, and 
if they are exercised within vocational groups. 
Therefore the Pope does not say in this section of "Quad-
ragesimo Anno" that the ideal Industrial Democracy must have 
one class-less managing-owning-laboring group in which individ-
ual or collective bargaining will be unknown. He merely says 
that the conflict arising from a lack of the right integration 
of management and labor must be done away with. 
In another section. of the Encyclical, the Pope makes his 
position in this matter quite clear: 
In the first place, it is obvious 
to all that the entire economic scene has 
greatly changed. You are aware, Venerable 
Brethren and Beloved Children, that OUr 
Predecessor, of happy memory, had chiefly 
in mind that economic regime in which were 
provided by different people the capital 
and labor jointly needed for production. 
He described it in a happy phrase: "Capi-
tal cannot do without labor, nor labor 
without capital". 
Leo XIII's whole endeavor was to ad-
just this economic regime to the standards 
of true order; whence it follows that the 
system itself is not to be condemned. And 
surely it is not vicious of its very nature; 
but it violates ~ight order whenever capi-
tal so employs the working or wage-earning 
classes as to divert business and e'conomic 
activity entirely to its own arbitrary will 
and advantage without ,any regard to the hu-
man dignity of the workers, the social char-
acter of economic life, social justice and 
the common good.~ 
16 
It seems clear that the system the Pope is defending is Capital-
ism (wh~n it is operating in a just manner, of course). It 
also seems clear that by Capitalism, the Pope means, among 
other things, that system in which "production is regulated by 
the cooperation of two groups bound by contract, one of which 
possesses all necessary goods, while the other •••••• contributes 
merely its personal labor" (as Goetz Briefs and Nell-Bruening 
put it.)6 Therefore the Pope seems to defend here a social 
system in which we have the two different classes, management 
and labor, provided, of course, that social justice and the 
common good are sought. The Pope is obviously against un-
bridled ambition and violations of justice. But he does not 
seem to be against the existence in society of these two dif-
ferent classes, management and labor. 
However, the Pope does not want the laboring class to be 
entirely non-managing and non-owning in his Industrial Demo-
5 
6 
Ibid., 427, Nos. 100,101. 
Ibid., 270 
., 
cracy. On the contrary, he wishes that steps toward ~ 
management and ownership for labor should be taken: 
In the present state of human sOCiety, 
however, We deem it advisable that the wage 
contract should, when possible, be modified 
somewhat by a contract of partnership as is 
already being tried in various ways to the 
no small gain both of the wage earners and 
of the employers. In this way, wage-earners 
are made sharers in some sort in the owner-
ship, or the management, or the profits. [Italics ours] '{ 
Therefore the Pope wants managing-labor and indeed managing-
owning labor, at least to some extent. However, he modifies 
the assertion by the words "somewhat" and "in some sort" so 
17 
that he cannot be said to base his whole reconstruction of the 
social order on the complete substitution (within the vocation-
al groups) of managing-owning-laborers for managers and labor-
ers bargaining with each other. Indeed in the preceeding sec-
tion, he asserts that the wage contract is not essentially 
unjust.8 
7 Ibid., 419, No. 65 
8 The ideal of Pope Pius XI was clearly that of the widest 
possible ownership of the means of production. An owner-
less group might be permitted, but only ad interim, until 
this wider diffusion could be achieved. Such was also the 
ideal of P9pe Leo XIII: "Many excellent results will fol-
low from this (fair wages and sacredness of private prop-
erty); and first of all, property will certainly become 
more equitably divided ••• lf work-people can be encouraged 
to look forward to obtaining a share in the land, the result 
will be that the gulf between vast wealth and deep poverty 
will be bridged over and the two orders will be brought 
nearer together." (Nell-Bruening, pp. 386-7, "Rerum 
Novarum", No. 35). ' , 
18 
., 
Thus it is clear that the Pope's Industrial Democracy does 
not necessarily exclude separate groups of management and labor. 
But these groups will be broken up within vocational groups, 
in which collective bargaining will continue, modified by jus-
tice and the common good of each particular vocational group. 
We also see that there will be a greater diffusion of produc-
tive ownership than we have at present so that "some" laborers, 
at least, will also be manager-owners. 
It will be well to note the Pope's own commentary on his 
plan in the Encyclical "Divini Redemptoris" of 1937. He reiter-
ates· the need for a vocational society; 
We have indicated how a sound prosper-
ity is to be restored according to the true 
principles of a sane corporative system which 
respects the proper hierarchic structure of 
society; and how all the occupational groups 
would be fused into a harmonious unity in-
spired by the principle of the common good. 9 
He also implies that in the Industrial Democracy, management 
and labor and the wage contraot are not to be extinct: 
We explained clearly the right and dig-
nity of labor, the relations of mutual aid and 
collaboration which should exist between 
those who possess capital and those who 
work, the salary due in strict justice to 10 
the worker for himself and for his family. 
9 Pope Pius XI, "Atheistic Communism", ("Divini Redemptoris"), 
paulist Press, New York City, 1937, 13, No. 32. 
10 Ibid., 13, No. 31 
The American Bishops in a pastoral letter of 1940 re-s!ate 
and re-emphasize this same position of the Pope: 
There must be re-established some 
form of guild or vocational groups which 
will bind men together in society accord-
ing to their respective occupations, thus 
creating a moral unity.ll 
Not only must employers and employees 
be organized singly and jointly, but their 
~r~!~~!io~~dm~~~i~~ !~l~~!~~!~I!1ith Chris-
19 
Thus the Bishops state that the need for a vocationally organ-
ized society is truly imperative. They also imply that within 
this society the sparate employer and employee groups are not 
necessarily to be abolished. 
Many modern commentators have attempted to explain and 
elaborate the principles of the Popes r Plan. Father Wilfrid 




It should be clear, I think, that 
the Pope is not talking of the "orders" 
as something new to be fashioned, but as 
something that already exists. Whether 
they think of it or not, there is a com-
mon interest between all, employers and 
employed, who are engaged, each in his 
own way, in producing a certain com-
modity or rendering a certain service 
Archbishops and Bishops of Administrative Board of National 
Catholic Welfare Conference, "The Church and Social Order", 
NCWC, Washington, D.C., 1940, 27, No. 54. 
Ibid., 28, No. 56. 
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Here Father Parsons would seem to exclude the Industr~Councils 
Plan of the CIO (which we shall treat in a later chapter) as 
the ideal realization of the Popes' Plan. Presumably the CIO 
plan would be useful only as a stepping stone to a true voca-
tional order. In such an order "horizontal" labor unions, such 
as the CIO and the AFL would tend to divert a laborer's loyalty 
from his own vocational group to the labor movement as a whole, 
and "horizontal" management 'associations would tend to make an 
executive more loya~ to his class than to his own vocational 
group. Hence such "horizontal" free associations would be a 
source of disharmony in the vocational group system. However, 
such associations can be very useful as means of arriving at 
the vocational order. But they should gradually become sub-
merged in their various vocational groups. 
Father Nell-Bruening sees in the Popes' Plan two separate 
management and labor classes, cooperating, however, with jus-
tice: 
Corporate order does not touch upon 
the separation of capital and labor. Inso-
far, therefore, capitalistic economy as un-
derstood by the Encyclical (111,1) is 
entirely possible also in a corporate order 
of human society. However, the establish-
ment of the right order for human society 
eliminates from the separation of capital 
and labor that side which makes it so un-
bearable at present; it makes full-fledged 
and fully qualified professional members 
of those who by their labor add to produc-
tion, and thus to the common contribution 
to the welfare of SOCiety; thereby it 
restores them to the nation; it assures them 
of their standing in society, something 
that had become lost! Thus it restores 
true national order. 6 
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It is clearly Father Nell-Bruening's position that the Popes' 
new order does not call for a complete overthrow of our old ec-
onomic and social order, but only a modification of it by 
grouping it vocationally under justice and charity. Thus we 
have seen that the Popes, the Bishops, and specialists in Catho-
lic social thought have a reasonably unified and consistent set 
of principles for social reconstruction. The vocational plan 
they offer we have called Industrial Democracy. 
In arriving at a working definition of Industrial Democracy 
we meet this question: How are the vocational groups or orders 
to be governed? "Quadragesimo Anno" treats this briefly: 
It is hardly necessary to note that 
what L eo XIII taught concerning the form 
of political governments can, in due meas-
ure, be applied also to vocational groups. 
Here, too, men may choose whatever form they 
please, provided that both justice and the 
common good be taken into account. 17 
Therefore, according to the Pope, if the subjects in a given 
vocational group wish to rule through elected representatives 
(republicanism, often called "democracy"), well and good. If 
they wish to leave actual governing to a governing class 
(quaSi-aristocracy), well and good. If they wish a kmd of 
:constitutional monarch to run their group, again well and good. 
16 Nell-Bruening, 233. 
17 Ibid., 424, "Quadragesimo Anno", No. 86. 
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Anyone of these forms of rule or any variation of them may be 
more desirable in certain cases, provided that in every case 
power is recognized to be from God, and provided that justice 
is done and the common welfare sought. 
A final question regarding the Pope's ideas on Industrial 
Democracy cannot be put aside. How is industrial Democracy 
to be brought about - by "compelling" social legislation imposed 
from above by the state - or by the initiative and control of 
the vocational groups themselves, helped and unified merely 
by the "enabling" legislation of the state? The Pope's views 
on this are clear. By his famous "Principle of Subsidiarity", 
and by his direct statement, (quoted above) that vocational 
groups are "in a true sense, autonomous", he shows that he 
does not wish the groups either to be established or run b,y a 
domineering state, imposing them from above. He recognizes 
the fact that some of the initiative and most of the legal 
authorization required for the beginning of the vocational or-
der would have to come from the state. He states, as we said, 
that the ",aim of social legislation must therefore be the re-
establishment of the vocational groups ••• " Howeve~, as Father 
Parsons points out, a better translation would be: "The 
social-political art, therefore, must set itself to re-estab-
lishing the 'orders'". The standard English version might 




gt'OUPS to be the mere creatures of goverIllJent. However the Pope 
JIlerely wished a minimum of "enabling" legislation to launch 
t~e groups who would be expected to do most of the work for 
t~eir own organization and management themselves. Thus the 




THE NRA EXPERIMENT 
The National Recovery Act and Administration are as dead 
as a dodo. But since they were the only "flesh and blood", 
practical experiment of a plan somewhat resembling the Pope's 
Plan in any modern industrial nation,a post-mortem examination 
of them is worthwhile. There were other corporative experiments 
in Portugal, Ireland, Belgium, Italy. None of these can help 
us very much. The Italian Corporative state was a Fascist Dic-
tatorShip, and hence not the Pope's plan at all. The Corpora-
tive plans of Portugal and other small countries have been ex-
cellent, and in some cases highly successful. However, because 
they are found only in small countries whose economic life de-
pends upon fishing, small agriculture and crafts, they are on~­
of negligible assistance in providing precedent for large 
countries whose economic life depends upon large scale agricul-
ture, mining and mass-production. The former German cartels 
might have been a help since they took place in a large indus-
trial nation. However because their organization was excess-
ively loose and because they made no pretence at being more 
than highly cooperative trade associations, they were too far 
removed from the Pope's plan to be of much assistance to us. 
The NRA, therefore, was the only large attempt at indus-




we can learn much by studying its life and the reasons for its 
demise. In fact we are all but compelled to do so if we would 
bring our plans for Industrial Democracy out of the skies of 
principle down to the brass tacks of practice. In this matter 
we follow the example of those who are attempting to plan a 
post-war league of nations. They do not simply start writing 
plans "ab· ovo". They turn back and study the old League of 
Nations, which, like the NRA, is also dead as the dodo, but 
which can tell us many things about launching a new league, 
things we could learn fro. no other source. Hence our justifi-
cation for bringing NRA back from the grave. 
The NRA dwelled among us for just two years - between the 
summer of 1933 and the summer of 1935. On June 16, 1933, 
Congress passed, and the President Signed, the National Indus-
trial Recovery Act. We were at the bottom of the Great Depres-
sion and at the beginning of the New Deal. The Act had three 
parts, or titles; the first was concerned with the organiza-
tion of industry and was to remain in force for two years; the 
second created a vast public works program) the third treated 
miscellaneous activities. We shall consider here only the 
I first title. The Act began with a declaration of policy. 
" ••• It is hereby declared to be the 
policy of Congress to remove obstructions to 
the free flow of interstate and foreign com-
merce which tend to diminish the amount 
thereof; and to provide for the general wel-
fare by promoting the organization of indus-
trY for the purpose of cooperative action 
among trade groups, to induce and maintain 
united action of labor and management under 
adequate governmental sanctions and super-
vision, to eliminate unfair competitive 
practices, to promote the fullest possible 
utilization of the present productive cap-
acity of industries, to avoid undue restric-
tion of production ••• to increase the con-
sumption of industrial and agricultural pro-
ducts by increasing purchasing power, to 
reduce and relieve unemployment, to improve 
standards of labor, and otherwise to rehab-
ilitate industr~ and to conserve natural 
resources. nl Utalics our~ 
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It is clear from this declaration of policy that the NRA had at 
least a double purpose, first, to promote recovery by various 
devices; second to induce certain needed social reforms. In 
this booklet it is important to note that we are concerned 
only with the second purpose of NRA, namely, social reforms. 
-In a way, it was unfortunate that these two purposes shOUld 
have been joined in one act, for Recovery had to be produced 
at once, but Reform is something which should come slowly. 
The purpose ofNlRA reminds us very much of "Quadragesimo 
Anno". The Act stated that it wished to promote the organiza-
tion of industry among trade groups and to induce united ac-
tion of management and labor. The Encyclical states that we 
must re-~stablish vocational (trade) groups and abolish con-
flict between classes with divergent interests. We certainly 
1 Lyon, Homan, Terborgh, Lorwin, Dearing, Marshall, "The Na-
tional Recovery Administration", The Brookings Institution, 
Washington, D.C., 1935, 889. 
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• do not claim that the NIRA was an exact statement or the Pope's 
Plan. But we do claim that it approached the Pope's Plan 
rather closely both in theory and in application. 
It will be interesting to consider brierly the more im-
portant sections or the NIRA.2 Section One declared the pol-
icy or the Act. This is given above. Section Two empowered· 
the President to set up the vast machinery needed ror the ad-
ministration or the Act, and also to delegate his powers to 
his chosen administrators. Also, this section limited the ex-
istence or NIRA to two years or less. Section Three contained 
the meat or the Act ror it gave the procedure by which the 
codes (or laws or the various trade groups) were to be drawn 
up. It stated that the initiative towards rorming the codes 
should come rrom trade associations. The President might ap-
prove such codes ir he round that the applicants were not un-
rair to others in their trade, ir these applicants were really 
representative or their trade, and if they did not "promote 
monopolies or •• eliminate or oppress small enterprises." 
Paragraph (b) made the approved codes legally binding, rully 
equal to United States law. Paragraph (c) stated that the 
Department or Justice and the District Courts were empowered to 
enrorce these "non-congressional", semi-public Codes. Para-
graph (r) made violations or the codes a misdemeanor with a 
2 Ibid., 889. 
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fine of $500 a day for each offense. 
Section Four (b) gave great power to the President. It 
gave him the authority to issue licenses and to revoke them for 
any given trade or industry_ If he saw a business was engaged 
in vicious price cutting or wage cutting he could refuse to 
issue a license or he could revoke one at will if it had al-
ready been obtained. It would, of course, be a serious misde-
meanor to do business without a license. Thus the President 
practically had powers of life or death over business. 
Section Five stated that those concerns who were operating 
under the code system would be exempt from all anti-trust leg-
islation. No doubt this was rich bait at which many big 
business houses jumped. 
Section Seven was the famous labor section equalling a 
real Magna Charta for labor, guaranteeing its right to organize 
and bargain collectively, and specifying that conditions re-
garding maximum working hours and minimum wages must be writ-
ten into the codes and approved b,y the President. It is impor-
tant to remember that in 1933, labor was much less powerful 
than it is now, and vertical unions like the CIO were practical 
ly non-existent. Because of this fact, labor was never 
adequately represented in the drafting of the codes. This 
difficulty we shall treat at greater length in a later chapter. 
Finally, it should be said that the National Industrial 
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Recovery Act gave unprecedented peacetime powers to the Presi-
dent to make and administer a considerable body of law. The 
question as to whether it was not merely "enabling" legisla-
tion but also "compelling" legislation will also be treated 
in detail below. 
The National Industrial Recovery Act had as its foremost 
creature the National Recovery Administration. This was the 
agency created to supervise the preparation of the codes and 
to enforce their observance. Gen. Hugh S. Johnson was named 
the first Administrator. The historian, Beard describes the 
process: 
To supervise and press forward the 
process of organizing trade, industry and 
labor, the NRA was established under the 
direction of Gen. Hugh Johnson, who combined 
a limited amount of homely wisdom with the 
irritating methods of a drill sergeant. 
Leaders in commerce, industry, and trade 
unionism rolled into Washington. Amid much 
confusion and table pounding, codes were 
drafted, approved, and put into effect. 
Wrangles within and between trade associa-
tions were heard and decisions rendered. 
To every individual and concern that com-
plied with the terms of the appropriate code, 
an emblem - the Blue Eagle - was awarded. 
Like a sudden rash, Blue Eagles burst forth 
in the windows of shops, on walls of factor-
ies, and in the advertisements of merchants. 3 
Beard is perhaps a little hard on Johnson, whose pugnacity 
Charles A. and Mary R. Beard, "America in Midpassage", 
Macmillan, New York City, 1939, 234. 
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seemed really necessary to get the stalled wheels or recovery 
moving again. 
The chier assistants of the Administrator4 were Assistant 
Administrators ror Industry, Labor and Special Problems, the 
General Counsel and the Economic Adviser. There were also 
seven division administrators5 in charge of the codes them-
selves, in fields ranging from the rield of mining, metals, 
~ilities, automobiles, rubber and shipping activities, to the 
field or publishing and graphic arts industries. There was a 
compliance board charged with the enrorcement or the codes. 
Then there were three advisory boards. 6 The Industrial Advis-
ory Board, composed of business-men, advised the Administrator 
on all matters or industrial policy. The Labor Advisory Board 
was to help out with labor questions especially regarding 
child labor, the right to organize, wages and hours. The Con-
sumers Advisory Board was supposed to guide the Administrator 
in problems vital to consumers - prices and quality. This 
Board, unlike the other two, was not backed up by any pressure 
group. 
Once the huge NRA machinery started to grind out the codeS 
rrom June 1933 to March 1934, it was marked by tremendous vital-
ity, and also orten by conrusion and even hysteria. The code--
making process7 in most cases was comparatively simple. 
4--L;~~~ 55 
5 Ibid., 51 
~ t£ia:, 1~8 
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Representative groups in each industry, usually working through 
their trade associations (and therefore without labor represen-
tation) drew up codes which were then presented to the NRA for 
consideration. Public hearings were held under the direction 
of deputy administrators, at which the viewpoints and objec-
tions of consumers, labor, and other interested parties could 
be presented; upon the acceptance of these codes by the deputy 
and division administrators, the documents were submitted to 
the President or the NRA Administrator for his approval. (In 
practice, Johnson ran the whole show.) After the proper ap-
proval , the code had all the force of a statute. Once the 
code was completed, an agency was set up in each industry, 
called the Code Authority, which was indeed, the agency of 
self-government in the industry. In most cases, the Code Author 
ities were merely the old trade associations in new guise, ex-
cept for the occasional addition of a small number of "publicly 
known" representatives. Labor as such was given a formal 
place on very few of the Code Authorities. 
Compliance with the codes of fair competition and with 
the President's Reemployment Agreement (which we shall describe 
below) was obtained by the Compliance Division, both regional 
and national, except in those cases where labor disputes were 
involved. These were handled by the newly created National 
Labor Board. Difficult cases of compliance were turned over 
~ 
to the Attorney General for prosecution in the district 
courts. 
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The difficulties attendant upon drafting the codes, and 
the impossibility of one Administrator (Johnson) overseeing 
everything at the same time, created a bottleneck almost from 
the very start. The NRA was supposed to pull the country out 
of the depression, but the code-mill was grinding slowly and 
the situation was nearly desperate. Out of this situation the 
President's Reemployment Agreement was born, on September 1, 
1933. Under this agreement~ so-called "blanket" codes were 
drawn up between the President and various individual concerns 
who volunteered to enter the blanket code and who were not yet 
members of any standard code group. The blanket codes provided 
for many conditions of fair competition including minimum 
wages and maximum working hours. 
And yet the gigantic task of turning out the codes did 
proceed apace. The first code to be signed was the cotton tex-
tile code, approved by the President on July 9, 1933; on July 
26, the wool, textile and sbipbuilding codes were approved; on 
August 4, the electrical and coat-and-suit codes; on August 
19, the petroleum, iron and steel, and lumber codes. By the 
middle of May 1934, more than 4GO codes had been prepared and 
signed, while an additional 300 codes already had had their 
hearings completed. A year after the establishment of the NRA 
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it was estimated that some 20,000,000 workers were employed 
under the Blue Eagle. 
During the first half-year of the NRAfs existence, most 
of its effort had been directed towards drafting the codes. 
But by March, 1934, it became increasingly obvious that indus-
try had to be educated and organized if it were to govern it-
self. Therefore the NRA staff now endeavored to supply the 
codes which had already been drafted with adequate administra-
tive and enforcement machinery. More time was spent on organ-
izing and supervizing Code Authorities, and especially now in 
enforcing compliance with the codes.8 
After a year of existence, NRA was still in serious 
trouble because of the enormity of its task and also because 
of its own internal wrangling and confused adminttration. The 
Brookings Survey makes the following perhaps rather harsh diag-
nosis: 
At the en~ of the first year, in spite 
of numerous reorganizations and adjustments, 
both in structure and in method, the NRA was 
a sprawling, poorly co-ordinated, and rela-
tively ineffective organization. Innumerable 
shifts in internal mathod had kept the admin-
istrative personnel in constant confUSion, 
and the code authority representatives in a 
state of irritation. Morale both of NRA 
and industry agencies was anything but the 
best. Each NRA policy or procedural announce~ 
ment, followed as it was by modifications, 
8 Ibid., 54 
retractions and explanations (for example, 
on price policy, budgets, and government con-
tracts) gave rise to a series of "revolts" 
among industry members of various codes. 
Contending factions had sprung up within the 
NRA itself. Public discussion and general 
opinion were both pointing toward a change 
of direction for NRA. 9 
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The situation was rapidly drawing to a climax. Gen. Johnson 
clearly saw the handwriting on the wall. He stated in August, 
1934: 
No one man can watch the operation of 
450 codes - I hope we can reduce them to 250 
by consolidation, but even that is too many 
for one man. It needs a commission. I think 
the War Industries Board model was good - a 
commission of responsible executives sat to 
co-ordinate activity, but it had no vote. Its 
chairman was responsible and had the final 
decision. lU 
The crash came on September 27, 1934, when the President (with 
sincere commendations of Johnson's efforts) substituted the 
National Industrial Recovery Board for the single NRA Adminis-
trator. ll This Board was made up of five members (appointed 
by the President), plus two ex-officio members. It was to 
have all the pow-ers and duties formerly held by Johnson. How-
ever its work was subject to the general approval, of a bigher 
committee, the Industrial Emergency Committee, which was 
charged with the general policy-making of the NRA subject in 
9--Ibid~, 67 
10 Gen. Hugh Johnson, NRA Release No. 7119, Aug. 2, 1934; 




turn to the approval of the President. The Industrial Emer-
gency Committee was composed of the Secretaries of the Interior 
and of Labor, the Chairman of the National Industrial Recovery 
Board, the Administrator of the Agricultural Adjustment, the 
Administrator of Federal Emergency Relief, and the Director of 
the Committee. 
The Recovery Board undertook a drastic re-organization of 
the NRA machinery. (For chart of final set-up, see page 37.) 
The function of effecting compliance was clearly distinguished 
from the function of supervising the codes. Divisions were 
re-grouped on the basis of function, and authority was decen-
tralized. But the re-organization did little to stem the ris-
ing tide of opposition to the NRA. Enthusiasm for the Act was 
dying by the end of 1934, and the almost insuperable difficul-
ties of enforcement were worrying the Administration. Now 
the Act was attacked by some of the very businessmen who had 
sponsored it in the first place, a year and a half before. 
None of the various pressure groups originally interested in 
the NRA were satisfied that they were getting out of it any-
thing like what they had once hoped they would. The job of 
trying to get industry to try peaceful methods of cooperation 
instead of the old hit-and-run competition had seemingly 
proved too big a job. A demand for the old free-for-all 
competition spread throughout the land. We shall see in later 
THE NRA IN ITS FINAL FORM, BEGINNING SEPT. 27, 19a4 
I PRES'OENT OF U.S.A. I 
IN DUSTRlAL 
EMf:RGENCY COMMITTEE 
1- I-A60R-- ... J-.. 60AR.D _. 
J N~'T'ONAL IN DUSTR'AL RECOVERY ] 'J! SOAR.D Chairman, Exe.cut.ive, Secretar"!, 3 Additional Members 
] L.aw ye,. Economist I 
r CONSUMERS I--BOARD 




• ENFORCEMENT .6.DMI N ISTR.A.TION 
D' R.eCTOR. D' fl.E-CTOR. 
I I I I I I REG-'ONAL.I 
OFFICES 8 .. SlC T.XTlI..5S FOODS eMaMl· EQUIP· M,.,NU- I 
I MATER'''L.$ CALS MaNT FAtT~Rf.RS I (Pi". to. Deputy 
" " STATE 1 Admini- .. ., stra+o,.s) 
OFFICES 
[NLRB J... 
I F. T. C. ...::.::: 
IDept.of 11 ........ --
I I I 1 
CONSTR.ut- pU8LlC AMUS&'- CirR. .. PMIC DlSTR.l- PU8L.'C 





C. r ~ 
CODE CODE CODE 
AUTHOR-lTV AUTMOR.IT't "utMORITV 
fo\" lOor for 
EI ... a-\;.or R.etail Wholesale 
Mhs. JcweLr~ Coal 




chapters the detailed causes for the failure of NRA: code 
violations, fostering of monopoly, labor troubles, etc. 
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By this time there were over 585 Code Authorities,12 
which we might call "quasi-states fT of the NRA Industrial Demo-
cracy. Each of these little states was passing and administer-
ing its own laws or codes. Furthermore, there were several 
thousand regional and divisional agencies for administering 
the codes; these might be called fTmunicipalities fT in the Indus-
trial Democracy. The numbers of people involved in the codes 
varied from 45 workers in the Animal-soft-hair Code, to 
3,500,000 workers in the Retail Trade Code. Of course by this 
time the NRA itself had become a huge organization, employing 
more than 4,500 employees. Its codes filled 13,000 pages and 
were supplemented by over 11,000 executive orders which in 
some cases very much affected the codes. To say the least, it 
was all very bewildering. 
The end came at last, on May 27, 1935, when the United 
states Supreme Court unanimously agreed13 that the National 
Industrial Recovery was null and void, in the famous Schechter 
case. The Act was found defective for two main reasons. First, 
it was claimed that the Act violated our constitutional separa-
tion of powers by illegally delegating the legislative powers 
of Congress to the President in giving the President unduly 
12 
13 Ibid., 29. Beard, 264. 
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-wide and sweeping powers to set up codes (laws) of fair compe-
tition and to formulate general policies. 
Secondly, the Supreme Court ruled that the Act went beyond 
inter-state commerce and tried to regulate intra-state com-
merce, the which also is unconstitutional. The Schechter 
Brothers were shipping poultry into New York City from New Jer-
sey and other states, and then selling them in New York City 
at terms in violation of the Poultry Code. The Court held that 
the Schechters were engaging in inter-state commerce only dur-
ing the moments when the chickens were actually being shipped. 
But once the chickens arrived in New York City and were later 
sold, this later action was not inter-state commerce but intra-
state corrwerce ("intra" New York State), and could not be 
touched, therefore, by any federal regulation such as the NRA 
code. 
Thus, in the summer of 1935, almost two years after its 
birth, the NRA, the one great experiment in Industrial Demo-
cracy, was laid in its grave. There can be little doubt but 
that it was dead months before the Schechter case. Not only had 
it failed to bring about Recovery (with which problem we are 
not concerned here), but also it had not really proved to be 
Industrial Democracy at all. Yet it was the closest attempt 
that had ever been made in a 'modern industrial nation. To say 
the least it was a "noble experiment". 
CHAPTER IV 
THE BASIS OF VOCATIONAL GROUP UNITY 
Did the NRA believe there was a basic unity actually pres-
ent within each of America's various industrial groups? Did 
the NRA find a common bond binding together everyone in the 
steel business, for example, the scrub women, the puddlers, the 
electricians, the chairman of the board of directors - into 
one little society? Or ,",vas such a bond of unity just consid-
ered a pious fiction of dreaming social planners? To answer 
these questions, we must first understand clearly just what is 
meant by a "bond of unityfT. 
Suppose a pe:.rty of travelers is shipwrecked on a south sea 
island. There are men, women, and children in the party, 
Catholics, Protestru1ts and Jews, blacks and whites, business-
men, carpenters, sailors, writers, mechanics, etc. There is no 
sign of habitation on the island but it is luxurious with trop-
ical fruits and some small game. The surrounding sea has plen-
ty of fish. The island is not large however, and the casta-
ways are many. The food must be sought. Tropical. storms are 
prevalent. Fever lurks in the bush. Obviously there is a job 
to be done if these people are to survive. 
Now we ask the questions: Is there a basis of unity in 
this party of very diversified travelers? Do the very circum-
stances of their shipwreck seem necessarily to bind them to-
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gether in a little society which is to last at least while 
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they are together on the island? The answer is surely: Yes. 
These people are all "in the same boat" or on the same island. 
If they are to survive, they must work together. Some must 
fish, others pick fruits, others make shelters, others make 
clothes and instruments. If there is a doctor, he will have to 
tend the Sick; if there is an electricia.n, he will try to im-
provise a radio with v'iha t parts he has in order to call for 
help, etc. However, if each castaway insists on doing just 
what he pleases, doubtless many, or most, of the group will per-
ish. If they are to survive, there must be order, authority; 
there must not be anarchy. These people all have a common end, 
namely survival. Moreover, they must all use common means to 
attain that end. The radioman tries to fix up a radio not on~ 
for himself but as a common means for saving all. The fisher-
men do not catch fish just for themselves but as common food 
for the whole group. 
Now precisely because these people have a common end and 
can only attain it by using common means, therefore basic unity 
~ already among them •. It is true that they are not yet an 
organized society until they set up an authority to rule them-
selves. But they are potentially such a society; they should 
be such a society. The basis for unity is there. 
Viha t then, do we mean by a "basis of unity"? If people 
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are so throvm together so that they all have one common end or 
goal which they can only attain by common means, by working to-
gether, then, we assert, this common end and those common 
means constitute a basis of unity. Such people should form 
some kind of a society. 
We may now proceed to this question: Did NRA think there 
was a basis of unity within the various vocational or trade 
groups of this country? The answer is: Yes. l Otherwise why 
would NRA have tried to cement the various business of a trade 
group into one unit obeying one Code Authority? However, it 
is important to note that NRA did not theorize very much about 
the basis of vocational group unity. Nor did it have a com-
pletely adequate concept of this unity. The NRA planners saw 
that unfair competition within the various industrial groups 
and that badly plamled production were equally pulling down 
together all the business houses within those groups. There-
fore, thought these planners, we will bind these various busi-
ness houses together into Code Groups according to the similar 
products which they ~roduce or services which they perform. 
Thus each Code Group can solve the mutual competition and pro-
duction problems of all the members of that group_ Obviously 
therefore, NRA recognized the fact that all the textile busi-
nesses, to take one example, had a common end (economic prosper-
!~ll_!"h!ch could only best be attained by common means 
1 Lyon 415. 
., 
(mutually fair competition, pI'icing, production, etc.) NRA 
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saw, then, that there was a true basis for unity among the var-
ious trade groups. 
NRA's picture may be said to be incomplete, however, 
largely because it did not adequately include labor's share. 2 
The unity which NRA saw was unity largely between the various 
management staffs - a unity often rather closely knit in the 
various traue associations, such as the Iron and Steel Insti-
tute. This unity was not seen so clearly to include every last 
workingman within each trade group. Labor was thought of, of 
course - but rather at the periphery, than at the center of 
each group. The reason for this of course is quite unuerstand-
able when we remember that "industrial fT unions were practically 
unknown in 1933. However NRA may have failed to get the com-
plete picture of vocational group unity, it certainly did .point 
the way for us. For two years it got the country to recognize 
the real basis of unity which exists within our various trade 
groups. It is unfortunate that since the demise of NRA, this 
basic unity has been forgotten by many. 
What proof can we offer that there is, today, a real ba-
sis of unity within our vocational groups? (We shall consider 
at this point, only those vocational groups whose area seems 
2 Ibid., 120-3, 423, Also National Recovery Administration 
Release No. 5418, May 31, 1934, 3. 
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clearly defined, such as steel, autos, power, etc. We abstract 
here from those heterogeneous groups such as retail trade and 
agriculture, since it is verydfficult to determine what busi-
nesses should be considered to be within these groups, and what 
should not be so considered.) Can we prove that there is today 
a common bond of unity linking together everyone working in the 
steel buSiness, for example •••• linking together the iron miners, 
the ore boat sailors, the blast furnace operators, the sheet-
mill workers, the switch-engine engineers, the office clerks 
and stenographers, the metallurgists, the engineers, the elec-
tricians, painters, carpenters, plumbers, crane operators, fore-
men, scrubwomen, watchmen, executives, salesmen, advertising 
men, statisticians and accountants, office boys, board of dir-
ectors? Are all these people, doing so many different things, 
really linked together by one common bond which we shall call: 
STEEL? Have the electricians of the Inland Steel Company for 
example, more in common with all the other workers and exec-
utives of the Inland Steel Company and the other steel compan-
ies than they have with the electricians of some street-car 
company, or some contracting firm? They have. They belong to 
steel. 
our proof for the above is founded on the follovdng fact: 
Prosperity goes up or down in this country, primarily by indus-
tries. (Though it is also true that when many industries con-
cur in their variations, a common variation of the whole 
45 
41 
business cycle is had.) Thus it is that the whole machine-tool 
industry, for example, goes up or down, rather independently 
of other industries such as autos, textiles, etc. We certainLy 
do not deny here that ~ industries inter-act and affect each 
other. But we do assert that variations first begin within an 
industry, and first affect ~ industry. The survey, nNation-
al Income in the United states - 1929-35" proves statistically 
these variations by industry. It sums up this point as 
follows: 
In reality, all income payments are 
drafts on the national income ••• the break-
down of the national income by industrial 
classification indicates sometning of the 
relative importance of the various industries 
in contributing to the net product of the Na-
tion, in giving employment to gainful workers 
and in disbursing compensation to individuals 
for their efforts. Moreover the divergence 
of trends and fluctuations in income for dif-
ferent industries reflects the changing na-
ture of our industrial pattern, the stability 
or instability of different industries during 
various stages of business cycles, and to 
some extent the interde2endence of all indus-
tries ••• (Income payment~ can be of consider-
able value in studying the past and planning 
for the future, provided they are interpreted 
correctly. {j:talics ourS] 0 
3 "National Income in the United States--1929-35 ff , U.S. 
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Domestic and Foreign 
Commerce, 21, cited by Rev. B.W. Dempsey, 8.3., "Corporate 
Democracylf, Central Bureau Press, st. LOUis, 1941, 14. 
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The "Statistical Abstract of the United States" also shows the 
importance of variations - ~ industries - of the national in-
come produced annually. These industrial variations seem to be 
fully as important as the variations of the total income pro-
duced. 
All in the Steel Industry, for example, go up and down 
together, as the Industry prospers or suffers - no matter what 
is happening in other industries. All, from scrubwomen to 
President, are in the same boat in the Steel Industry. Natur-
ally they all want economic prosperity; and they all get it (or 
lose it) together. Therefore does not this prove that they 
all have a common ~ - namely, mutual prosperity? 
Is it not also true that all in the Steel Industry can at-
tain this common end only by working together, that is, by 
common means? If Labor strikes, not only Labor loses but also 
Management loses. If Management mismanages, not only does 
Management lose, but Labor loses too. In other words, it means 
more to an electrician in the steel business that his steel 
executives do a good job of managing, than it does that some 
electrician working in the contr&cting business does a good job 
of being an electrician. The steel 'elec~trician has more in 
common with the steel executives than he has with the contract-
ing electrician because his prosperity (at least immediately) 
goes up or down with the steel industry, not with the contract-
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ing business. Now if all in the steel industry have a real 
common end, which they can only best attain through common 
means, then they are bound together by a common bond of unity. 
There is a real basis of unity already present among them. It 
is true that this unity has not expressed itself in fully uni-
fied cooperative action. These people have not "actualized" 
their COIDlilon basic unity into an industrial society. But since 
they really have true basic unity, they are potentially such a 
society. All they need is some sort of authority to activate 
and order their natural unity. As Father Bernard Dempsey puts 
it: 
••• There are in our country ••• real voca-
tional groups actually, whether they are con-
scious of it or not, bound together by their 
common functions of producing this or that 
for the nc3.tional product. When we attempt to 
compute figures which will show the state of 
national welfare, we immediately come face 
to face with that fact ••• The corporative or-
der, therefore, calls for the explicit recog-
niti~n of relationslups that are alreaQy pres-
ent. 
It seems clear that American business competitors in the 
same industries are closely interdependent with regard to 
fair prices, fair competition, fair wages, quality, optimum 
quantity to be produced, etc. Of course, we do not deny that 
all our industries are interdependent; but we do assert that 
the interdependence of firms within a trade group is primary 
4 Dempsey, 15. 
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and of greatest importance to those firms. We do not deny, 
therefore, the interaction between industries - the fact that, 
for example, if steel prices are unduly high, steel users will 
substitute lighter metals or plastics, thus causing a probable 
slump in the steel business - the fact that, if coal miners in-
sist upon unduly high wages, they will affect the price of el-
ectric power. It is clear that disputes and problems arising 
between the various industrial groups must be solved. For this, 
some sort of super-councilor board representing all the voca-
tional groups will doubtless be necessary. 
But we wish to stress here the real and close interdepend-
ence of business houses within their own industries. With this 
fact we must begin. If one company wants to pay fair wages, 
it is unable to do so unless its competitors (first of all, 
within its industry) also pay fair wages. Of course we grant 
that many firms outside of its industry may be its potential 
competitors by substitute products and that, therefore, they 
too must pay fair wages in order that our one company may afford 
to do so. But the problem begins, and is most acute, within 
a given industry. It must be solved first there, so that a 
reasonably united industrial front may be presented to other 
substitute-product industries, that the remaining problem be-




The CIO has clearly recognized this need for industry-wide 
cooperation: 
Obviously one company could not grant a 
general increase to its maintenance workers 
without putting its costs out of line with the 
rest of the industry. Such a large-cost prob-
lem requires simUltaneous consideration and ac-
tion throughout the whole of an industry.5 
••• Two weeks after SWOC (~he Steel Workers 
OrganiZing Committee) signed its first contract 
with the largest steel firm, in the spring of 
1937, its officers presented several admittedly 
meritorious grievances involving big cost items. 
Management said; "We have signed a contract 
with your union. But most of our major competi-
tors have not. We have taken on costs through 
our contract which these competitors have not 
yet assumed. We're hard-pressed enough. Why 
don't you bring these other companies into 
line? Then wa'll see what can be done about 
these grievances you are pressing that would 
only raise our costs at present." The union 
recognized these reasons to be sound, it ac-
cepted the fact that the extent to whic:h it 
could advance the economic interests of its mem-
bers was limited until every major producer in 
the industry was organized and operating under 
a like collective-bargaining contract. 6 
[j:talics ours"J 
The CIO is not talking merely about industry-wide labor organi-




The limitations on union-management rela-
tions at the level of the local plant and indi-
vidual firm are a constant, irresistible pres-
sure on unions and management alike to extend 
Clinton, Golden and Harold Ruttenberg, "The Dynamics of 
Industrial Democracy", Harper, New York City, 1942, 303. 
Ibid., 310-11 
r 
their relations. In no small measure the in-
dustrial strife of the last few years is at- ~ 
tributable to the absence of'industry-wide as-
sociations of management designed especially 
to work out many of these problems with nation-
al unions. 7 
The CIO believes there is a basis for unity by industries be-
50 
caUse of the natural interdependence of firms therein. -It con-
siders the recognition of this fact "a natural and necessary 
development ll : 
Thus in steel the patterns of industrial 
democracy on an industry-wide basis that pre-
vail in the coal industries are becoming vis-
ible. That they will eventually develop into 
formal conferences between two co-equal indus-
try-wide organizations, fully empowered to 
negotiate the basic terms of employment for the 
industry, seems to us to be both a natural and 
a necessary development. 8 
Thus we have a large labor organization asserting through its 
spokesmen that there is a real basis for unity among the busi-
nesses (including both management and labor) within a given 
industry. It is precisely in the greater recognition accorded 
to labor in such industrial unity that the CIO program advances 
beyond the NRA experiment. 
The position of labor of course, is important. There can 
be no doubt that it is to labor's first interest to seek the 
prosperity of its entire industry. Ordway Tead stresses this 
in his "New Adventures in Democracy": 
7 
8 
As they (labor unions) gain inclusive 
membership, maturity, and able, continuing 
leadership, they are associations profoundly 
Ibid., 309. 
Ibid., 313. 
concerned to advance the total effectiveness 
of the specific calling or industry in the to-
tal economy. The well-established union is, 
and has to be, as much concerned as the associ-
ated employers of an industry, with the develop-
ment of conditions which foster that indus-
try's prosperity. There is a real sense in 
which the affiliated workers of an industry 
have more at stake in helping an industry to 
thrive than the salaried managers or the 
scattering of absentee stockholders. 9 
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Finally, therefore, we believe that the close economic inter-
dependence of American business - by industries - gives solid 
ground for the unification of those businesses into vocational 
groups. 
The vocational group unity which we have found is not un-
accompanied by difficulties. It is not alw&,ys easy to delimit 
American business into workable vocational groups. However, 
this problem is not so acute in the large, rather homogeneous 
basic industries, such as the fuel, raw materials, durable 
goods, foods and wholesale industries. The problem is acute in 
the many smaller, more independent businesses, such as retail 
trade. 
First, the difficulty of overlapping definitions. Under 
the NRA, each industrial or trade group tried to define its 
area of coverage. But in practice, many definitions overlapped 
9 Ordway Tead, "New Adventures in Democracy", Whittlesey 
House, MacGraw-Hill, New York City, 1939, 92. 
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one another either explicitly in the legal statement of the 
Code Authority, or implicitly.lO All this created severe jur-
isdictional conflicts between the various code authorities. 
We present several examples: The definition of the electrical 
manufacturing business is "the manufacture for sale of elec-
trical apparatus, appliances, material or supplies, and such 
other electrical or allied products as are natural affiliates". 
[Italics oursJ This small tail-end phrase left the door wide 
open to a variety of jurisdictional claims by the electrical 
manufacturing co<ie authority, which could thus elbow its way 
into the field of many other code authorities. Because of a 
like looseness of definition, there vvas a jurisdictional dis-
pute between the farm machinery authority and the road machin-
ery authority over the question: Who should control tractors? 
Conflicts of definition were also very severe in the garment 
industry. There were many code groups and each tried to define 
itself so as to be unique; but overla~ping was wide-spread. 
Some of the groups were as follows: The Women's Coat and Suit 
Group, Men's Clothing Group, Underwear and Allied Products 
Group, Infants and Children's Wear Group, Blouse and Skirt Code 
Group, etc. From the above, it is obvious that the maker of 
red woolen underwear might be under anyone of several codes. 
Moreover, the cotton Garment Group overlapped most of the 
10 Lyon, 15·0 
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others. And since it had easy wage and hour requireme~s from 
the point of view of the employer, many manufacturers sought 
refuge under it to escape the other code groups in the garment 
business. 
It is not easy, obviously, so neatly to define an industry 
or trade as not to overlap an allied industry or trade. liRA 
ran headlong into this difficulty and was facedwith an angry 
sea of jurisdictional conflicts between various code groups as 
a result. Tlus difficulty of definition remains today and will 
remain in the future. Anybody who tries to revamp America in-
to an Industrial Democracy must solve tlas difficulty of de-
finition. In the case of a few industries like Steel and Autos, 
delimiting the area will be easy_ In the rest of our manufac-
turing, distributing, and other businesses, it will often be 
difficult. The difficulty of defining the various code groups 
is really the effect of the difficulty of classifying our 
many varied businesses. 
Secondly, the difficulty of classification of vocational 
groups. Under the NRA there were, in general, two types of 
classification-contrasts: "horizontal" versus "vertical" 
groups, and "straight-line" versus "circular" groups. 
rtHorizontal" and"vertical" groups.ll Most of the codes 
were rthorizontal" codes, that is, applying to ~ stage of 
11 Ibid., 153 
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manufacturing, processing or distributing a product, as for 
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example the Auto Group. "Verticaln codes were codes applying 
to two or more stages of manufacture, processing or distribu-
tion, as for example, the Lumber Group which extended from trees 
in the forest to wooden crates and baskets. Many important code 
were vertical. Serious jurisdictional overlappings were to 
be expected. Most of the manufacturing concerns were organized 
into horizontal groups handling only the ftmanufacture and 
first sale n of a definite list of products. Si~ilarly, the dis-
tributing concerns were organized into various specialized 
groups in the wholesaling and retailing levels. However, we 
have as an opposite extreme, the oil burner group which was or-
ganized all the way from manufacture to retailing in one long 
vertical code. Of course many concerns - the majority of those 
in v!-?rtical groups - were in groups handling only a few stages 
of processing. 
The Lumber Group was a good example of a code uniting many 
businesses of varying types from allover the country. The 
producing areas for lumber were widely scattered from Maine to 
Oregon and AlabamEl.. Many sma..L.L and some large firms were the 
producers. Many different types of wood were produced. There 
were many stages of lumber fabrication. There were many wood 
end-products. It was hard to see what basis of unity would 
hold together all these divergent groups against their natural 
55 
41 
separatist tendencies. Many codes were possible in this situa-
tion. Yet one all-embracing code was the result, covering 
everything from ,the felling of trees to wood shipping-crate 
manufacture. This was thanks in good part to the strong trade 
association organization of the lumber industry. Yet in spite 
of this strong vertical group, there were many other wood-
product groups, such as the insignificant -Nood-plug Group, the 
Paper Group, the Newsprint and Paperboard Group, etc. 
It is important to notice that nearly all the vertical 
groups began wilh the stage of actually preparing the raw ma-
terials which were later to be processed. This points to the 
economic logic ana efficiency of the vertical organization of 
industry and the resulting vertical code groups. It was evi-
dent that in many industries the vertical set-up meant savings 
and greater productivity. Businessmen put it in because it 
paid. It was also evident that not all industries lent them-
selves to the vertical set-up. It seems that both the hori~ 
zontal and the vertical types are with us to stay. 
Under the NRA, the co-existence of these two types made 
for difficulties. For example, many firms found themselves 
included in a horizontal group and in some vertical group as 
well - and were thus faced with a confusing and differing array 
of wage, hour, price and marketing regulations. Again, many 
distributors (retailers and wholesalers) found themselves 
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subject to codes which they themselves had had little part in 
forming, but which had been handed over to them by their manu-
facturers. 
"Straightline" and "circular" groups.12 A trstraightline" 
group is one that manufactures a single product or a very few 
closely related products derived from the same raw materials 
and selling on the same market. The Sandstone Code Group is 
an example. A "circular" group, on the other hand, is one 
that covers not only a.single product, but also a diverse 
range of complementary products related only because they have 
a common destination in the same end-product. An example of 
this is the Automotive Parts and Equipment Manufacturing Group, 
who are united because the windshield makers, the car radio 
makers, the tail light makers, the battery makers, the magneto 
makers, the upholstery makers, the carburetor makers, etc., 
all put their products on the same finished end-product, the 
car. 
There can be little doubt that "circular" code groups 
have reduced the number of basic codes and thereby the amount 
of "multiple coverage" which might be imposed upon any single 
business firm. They have, however, created difficulties of 
overlapping. For example, a manufacturer who makes rubber 
balls may find himself at the same time under the Toy Code 
12 Ibid., 157. 
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Group and the Athletic Goods Group. At once a jurisdictional 
problem arises; especially if these two groups have markedly 
different requirements about wages, hours, prices, etc. Under 
the NRA, this problem was serious. The social planner of In-
dustrial Democracy will have to meet it. Doubtless there will 
hc:.ve to be both "straightline" and "circular" groups. But the 
resulting confusion will be a practical obstacle to a system 
of industrial self-government. We believe the problem can be 
solved; but it will have to be met. 
The third difficulty wilich arises in the attempt to de-
limit code groups and which has already been mentioned, is that 
of "multiple coveragen • 13 By the time the NRA had reached its 
death struggle there were over 750 code groups. Many codes 
often included the same uanufacturer or business house in their 
constituency, so that· such a firm was "covered" by many codes 
at the same time, resulting in the difficulty of "multiple cov-
erage". Tr~s stubborn difficulty arose largely because of the 
great diversity of opArations often found housed under the 
roof of one American business house. Especially is this true 
in the field of retailing. If there were separate codes, for 
example, for retailing of food, of tobacco, of drugs, then the 
average "general store drug store!! might be cov(~red by three or 
13 Ibid., 158. 
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more codes at the same time, with the resulting confusion of 
different wage provisions, etc. The Brookings "National Recov-
ery Administration" cites an example of this difficulty: 
An example ••• is that of a certain New ~ng­
land factory which produces washing machines, 
vacuum cleaners, electric motors, and other 
lines, the number of applicable codes being ten. 
Certain 'Nork rooms are specialized by products, 
and the workers therein are clecrly under a 
single code. On the othar hand, there are 
metal, wood-working, and other shops where 
parts are made or materials processed for all 
departments. A single workman may in a single 
day work under two or three codes. Or at a 
single moment different workers in the same 
shop may be working under five or six codes. 14 
It would seem evident that the resulting wage, hour, and price 
confusion in the above New England factory would make code ob-
servance often an insuperable difficulty and code enforcement 
at least in some particulars almost impossible. Loopholes and 
chances for evasion of code-group requirements would abound. 
Multiple coverage was caused not only by the diverse op-
erations of many firms, but also by the vague and all-inclusive 
definitions of some of the codes (as we noted above). For 
example there was a code group call(3d the "Light Sewing Indus-
try, Except Garments". This group, at least according to its 
definition, included almost everybody and every firm doing any 
stitching or sewing on a button! Thus, multiple coverage was 
inevitable. 
Another aspect of multiple coverage occurred when one 
+4"Ibld:, 159 
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• definite business function, such as trucking, would lie within 
the scope of different code groups with different standards of 
competition. Brookings gives an example: 
Wholly similar trucking operations are 
being carried on by delivery fleets owned by 
retail stores and by for-hire truck operators 
performing delivery operations for retail 
stores under contract. Trucking operations 
performed by store-owned trucks are excepted 
from the jurisdiction of the trucking code. 
Since wage and hour provisions of the retail 
trade code are much less onerous than those 
of the trucking code, the situation tends 
to induce stores to purchase and operate 
their own delivery equipment at the expense 
of the independent trucker. 15 
Many other examples could be given which would show further the 
jurisdictional confusion between the various code groups under 
the NRA. 
The three difficulties which we have given to show the 
great difficulties involved in trying to delimit vocational 
groups, are not, we believe, insuperable. But we insist that 
they prevent the establishment of an Industrial Democracy from 
being an easy matter. Granted that a few industries like Steel 
and Autos may be easy to delimit, nevertheless the delimita-
tion of the vast remaining part of Americall industry will be 
far from easy. One of the mistakes of the NRA was that it 
formed too many codes too hastily. The above difficulties were 
15 Ibid., 161 
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• partially the result of this. To this extent the future social 
planner may avoid these difficulties if he plans fewer groups 
(than 750) and tries to establish them more slowly. However 
much of the difficulty remains because of the very complicated 
structure and functions of American business. We believe that 
careful planning, plus a certain amount of patient trial and 
error will bring a fair solution to the difficulty. Of course 
we do not think that Industrial Democracy can at once be ex-
tended to all business firms in the country. Anything org~nic 
is the result of slow, steady growth. 
CHAPTER V 
VOCATIONAL GROUP LEGISLATION 
The first problem of vocational group government concerns 
the very act of Congress which sets up the industrial self-
government machinery. In the case of the NRA, this was the 
NIRA, the National Industrial Recovery Act. VJhat was the na-
ture of this Act as a legislative technique, and what can it 
tell us about a future act necessary to bring about our Indus-
trial Democracy? 
First, the NIRA was administrative, executive, or enabling 
law. l That is, the Congress laid down a line of policy, but 
the specific detailed content of the law derived from the 
rules and regulations promulgated by the Administration, the 
Executive, the President of the U.S. The administration there-
fore exercised in large degree what was really legislative 
power. Moreover, it had some power to interpret the rules and 
to settle disputes arising under them, thereby exercising what 
are, strictly speaking, judicial powers. Thus to some extent, 
at least, our old traditional division of powers between the 
--------
1 For a brief treatment, written before the Schechter deciSion, 
of the problems of administrative law by governmental agen-
Cies, see the Brookings survey, Lyon, 31-7. Also, William 
Bennett Munro, "The Government of the United states", Mac-




legislative, executive and judicial branches of government was 
broken down. 
Is ~ delegation of powers a bad thing? Very likely 
not. However, the NRA was, as one Supreme Court Justice put 
it, !!delegation run wild". For that reason, mainly, it was de-
clared unconstitutional. This much we learn, therefore, from 
the NIRA •••• any future act must avoid the reef of unconstitu-
tionality. This should not be a serious problem since the 
Congress could ratify in some way the legislation of the execu-
tive branch. The Code Authority could present its plans to 
Congress for approval. 
Secondly, the NIRA was theoretically coercive legislation 
though practically it was rather persuasive than coercive. 
Section 3d of the Act2 enables the President to force the Act 
on American business, should it be necessary to do so. Sec-
tion 4b gives him licensing power over business, that is, ul-
timately the power of life and death.3 Theoretically, there-
fore the Act was coercive. However the President never used 
these powers. How much force did the NRA exert - practically? 
The answer to that question will vary with every code that was 
drafted. In some cases the NRA deputy administrator was him-
self snowed under by the business trade associations so that he 






• cases, the Administrator undoubtedly did attempt to coerce 
business. 4 However, we believe that as a whole the NRA should 
be styled "persuasive" rather than "coercive" legislation. 
Should some future Act be coercive or persuasive? We 
believe it should be flexible, that is, coercive enough to 
rouse that section of American business and l[cbor which will 
resist vocational organization, but not so coercive as to an-
tagonize those who will welcome such organization from the 
start. It is obvious that more or less coercian will have to 
be exerted as more or less resistance may be expected from the 
different industries. However it is very important that no 
coercion be used which will result in making the various Indus-
trial Groups mere extension tools of the U.S. Government. The 
will to organize vocationally, the enthusiasm, the initiative 
should come "from below", from Management and Labor. Obviously 
the first legal steps will have to be taken by the Congress of 
the United states. Obviously too, some government agency will 
have to start the ball rolling to organize the many divergent 
interests among Labor and Management. But the goal is Indus-
trial ~-government, not government controlled Industrial 
puppet-government. 
It should be obvious too, that we cannot successfully 
reach such a goal as this by revolutionary changes but only by 
4 Ibid., 134-7. 
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evolutionary changes. The great fault of the ~~A was that it 
tried to launch the ship of industrial democracy before that 
ship's hull and launching ways were completed, that is, before 
American business and labor were prepared for it. We must use 
the existing agencies we now have in existence and try to 
shape them gradually towards industrial democracy. To be con-
crete: we must try to refashion the AFL, CIO, Association of 
Manufacturers, the various co-operatives, trade associations, 
etc., along the lines of industrial democracy. We cannot 
simply junk all our existing agencies and suddenly start an 
ideal industrial democracy. We must use what we have. We can-
not stop our economic machine; we must remodel it while it runs. 
For example, the CIO's Political Action Committee is now (1944) 
proposing a National Planning Board which shall encourage 
I!the establishment for each industry of an Industry Council 
composed of representatives of labor, management, or agricul-
ture if the case requires, and government, to assist in the 
formulation and administration of plans for full production 
and full employment within such industry".5 Here is an exist-
ing agency which is heading tovvards some sort of an industrial 
democracy. Let it be used, not opposed. Rather let it be 
encouraged and refashioned towards the Pope's Plan for 
5 "Economic Democracy", 1.h§. VI/age Earner, Association of 
Catholic Trade Unionists, Detroit, July 7, 1944, 2. 
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industrial democracy. Only after American labor and management 
have been prepared for industrial democracy by education and 
experimentation will it be time to talk of formal campaigning 
and acts of Congress. This preparation is now in process. It 
is the job of the Catholic social planner to direct and encour-
age it. 
The second legislative problem concerns those legislative 
acts within the industrial groups for their own government. 
~vho were the law makers or the code makers under the NRA? 
There were four groups: 1) the code committee representing the 
applicant business group, 2) the representatives of the three 
advisory boards, 3) the representatives. of the two technical 
divisions and 4) the deputy administrator. 
~ Code Committee. Most committees represented trade 
associations of business men. The trade association was the 
easily available and obvious foundation upon which the NRA 
chose to build its industrial self-government. The harassed 
NRA administrators trying to organize a very disorganized Amer-
ican business in a very short time naturally seized upon what-
ever shreds of organization they could find. Such were the 
trade associations. As the NRA put it: 
Nearly every principal employer belongs 
to what is called a trade association. These 
associations were mostly formed long ago for 
what mutual help the memb~rs could get by 
agreement within the law (the anti-trust laws). 
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Ltions; however, it did seem to have the edge over the oth2r 
~roups, excepting perhaps the administrator. 
The three Advisory Boards. These boards were supposed to 
represent the three pressure groups interested in the outcome 
of the code-law. However, since they were purely advisory, 
they did not have a great deal of real power in the actual for-
mation of the codes. The Industrial Advisory Board, appointed 
by the5ecretary of Commerce, usually rubber-stamped whatever 
the business men's Code Committee was trying to put into effect. 
The Labor Advisory Board was somewhat more important. 
Since it was ~pointed by the Secretary of Labor, it was inde-
pendent of the direct control of the NRA administration. It 
was made up of leaders of organized labor, and one or two in-
dividuals supposedly qualified to represent unorganized labor. 
It had a permanent staff of labor specialists and drew heavily 
upon the facilities of the U.S. Department of Labor, the U.S. 
Employment Service, and the Public Health Service. In those 
industries in which organized labor was strong, the members 
of the Labor Advisory Board had strong labor backing when they 
did their share in negotiating a code. 8 But in those indus-
tries in which organized labor was weak (in 1933, the mass-
production inuustries), they had almost no strategic advantage 
at allover the other code-makers. Be it noted that those 
labor leaders on the Board were not from strongly integrated 
8 Ibid., 123. 
., 
vertical or industrial uruons simply because there were few 
such unions in 1933-4. 
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The Consumers' ltdvisory BOErd was a kind of odd fish. It 
was appointed by the Administrator and was supposed to repres-
ent all the consumers who might be affected by the code legis-
lation. Actually, however, unlike the industrial and labor 
advisory groups, it lacked support from any 'well-organized or 
articulate constituency. Consumers were usually either on 
the side of labor or on the side of man&gement; they had no 
organized basis for acting as a pressure group, either in initi-
ating measures to protect their interest, or in backing up the 
recommendations of the Consumers' Advisory BOard in the code 
bargaining process. Thus the Board had no real bargaining 
power. 
Representatives of the technical divisions. These divi-
sions were Legal and Research and Planning. They did not exert 
much influence in the actual framing of the codes unless the 
other groups happened to like and support their findings. 
~ Deputy Administrator. In some of the big Codes, Gen. 
Johnson himself I?erformed this function. For the hune_reds of 
smaller codes, it was impossible for him to have time to do so. 
The deputy administrator, however, had a great deal of power 
in the actual framing of the codes. 9 His functions were 
9 Ibid., 107. 
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multiple: supervising the bargaining process, entering into 
the bargaining process to promote what he understood to be NRA 
piicies, reconciling the forces of controversy into some sort 
of an agreement, judging the desirability of the result. 
We may now ask this question: Were the code-makers ade-
quately representative of the various pressure groups? Were 
they likely to produce good law? What warnings does the NRA 
set-up give to us about future code-makers in an Industrial 
Democracy? First of all, the Code Committee, representing (so 
largely) the trade association, seems to be a necessary and 
fair party to code making. It seems inevitable that the future 
social planner will have to deal with trade associations. Some 
industries, of course, will not be very "trade association 
conscious". In those industries, the business houses which are 
not members of the trade association will have to be represented 
fairly. NRA tried to do this. So must the future social plan-
ner. 
What about the Advisory Boards? It might be well in the 
future to have an Industrial Advisory Board; however it seems 
an unimportant matter and we pass over it here. But in regard 
to the Labor Advisory Board, we want to make what we consider 
a very important point. If this Labor Board is to have real 
power it must be composed of the representatives of that indus-
trial union in whose industry the code is now being set up. 
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Moreover, the industrial union should have true and strong 
bargaining power. The trouble under the NRA was that Labor 
never did have adequate representation in the drafting of the 
codes, because ~abor was unorganized in the mass-production 
industries and because labor had not yet become "industry 
conscious". As two CIO writers put it: 
Every time management has undertaken by 
itself to control the destlliies of an indus-
try, or group of industries, the result has 
been monopolistic and essentially undemocrat-
ic, because its primary preoccupation has 
been with profits and competitive positions. 
This is demonstrated by the history of the 
National Industrial Recovery Act in 1933-35.10 
Labor must be given a just share of bargaining power in the 
framing of the codes. As we implied, we believe that this can 
come only when, as, and if labor is organized along industrial 
lines. Therefore we believe that the growing strength of the 
CIO as opposed to the AFL is a good tendency. We do not claim 
that all craft unions must go; but we do believe that the in-
dustrial union is an essential element in our Industrial Dem-
ocracy. We do not say that under the NRA Labor did not have 
at times considerable power. It did. Especially in the framing 
of the Bituminous Coal Code. John Lewis, Philip Murray and 
others were in Washington for that job. They fought and 
fought hard. But they had power precisely because they were 
10 Golden and Ruttenberg, 330. 
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organized industrially, especially once the Northern and 
Southern Appalachian fields were united. 
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What about the Consumers Advisory Board? It is true that 
the rights of consumers must be safeguarded in the framing of 
code law. Any future Industrial Democracy ought to try to do 
a better job than the NRA did. However we do not know just 
how this job is to be done since consumers are not as yet a 
strong pressure group. Perhaps appeal could be made to some 
existing consumers' associations. 
In addition to the question as to WHO the code-makers were 
and should be, this further question is important: How did 
the code-makers make the codes? What was the actual process? 
What cap we learn from this? Gen. Johnson describes the pro-
cess actually used in making the codes: 
1) Industry (the Code Committee) was to make 
a proposal. 
2) It was to be submitted to a public hearing. 
3) Within NRA itself were departments made 
up of accredited representatives of the 




It was to be their business to point out 
every Code proposal which they thought might 
bear harshly or unfairly on the interests they 
represented. They voiced and supported their 
protest and ••• be assured ••• they did it. The 
Boards not only were to do this themselves 
but they were to activate and assist all public 
or private groups of similar interest to 
present their cases. 
4) These expressed conflicts of interest were 
then to be digested and the Deputy Adminis-
trator was to seek to compose as many as 
could be composed by conference. 
5) The Administrator himself, then, with the 
aid of the Department of Research and Plan-
ning and the Legal Department, was to seek 
either to get complete agreement of all con-
flicting interests, which was geneI-ally done, 
or else to narrow the field of disagreement 
to a point where a final decision to be re-
commended to the President would produce 
the maximum of fairness and justice and the 
minimum of harm to all interests. 
Of course we invented this system on the 
principle of trial, error and correction. It 
was for this r8ason that ••• the writer (Gen. 
Johnson) maue his prophecy about dead cats 
and his eventual decapitation. That required 
no foresight. ll 
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How did this process really work out in those hectic days of 
1933-1934? In most cases it was impossible for the deputy Ad-
ministrator to retain his position of impartial judge - he was 
forced into the fray itself, lending support first to one 
group and then to another according to his o'wn idea of desir-
able economic and social controls, or his own idea of how to 
hasten progress on the code. Rarely could he evaluate the 
whole code in the light of carefully analyzed and evaluated 
evidence. Rather the code grew, provision by provision, out of 
11 Gen. Hugh Johnson, "The Blue Eagle from Egg to Earth!!, 
Doubleday Doran, Garden City, New York, 1935, 202. 
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bargaining and haggling. 
Pity the poor deputyL He was submerged in a welter of 
conflicting testimony and statistics - how could he judge it in 
a short time? There were literally volumes of conflicting facts 
and claims brought forth by the two principal gladiators in the 
arena - theilide Committee and the Labor Adviser. Neither the 
testimony nor the statistical evidence was entered on the re-
cord undsr oath. There were factions even within the industries 
proposing the codes trying to convince the deputy of the dire 
consequences that would redound upon them if the code were to 
go through. There was the ac:.vice of the Consumers f Board and 
the Research and Planning Board - advice based on the principle 
that the bargaining process was bad. 
On top of all this, the Deputy had to remember that speed 
w,as the big thing - that he should get the codes completed 
as rapidly as possible with a minimum of obvious defiCiencies, 
with the least possible friction. He was told that re-employ-
ment considerations (we were at the bottom of the depression 
then) because of the emergency situation vvere more important 
than long-term rehabilitation. Johnson puts his policy 
clearly: 
There were two ways to go about the 
NRA job, one was to precede definite recov-
ery action by a slow academic study of all 
the complications and contingencies to be 
met in code drafting, punctuated by expert 
testimony and oriented in the long-term 
effects of those changes in economic balance 
that would inevitably result from the new 
recovery set-up - that is, in the opinion of 
men who, hov{ever rich in academic learning, 
never knew the weight of a business respon-
sibility in their whole lives. 
The other was to get the codes in, meet-
ing the unemployment situation after some 
fashion, cleaning up the work of the econ-
omic abuses, putting first things first, let-
ting the minor maladjustments fall where they 
might, and dealing with the long-term effects 
as they became evident. 
The choice was between academic conjec-
ture and action and the decision was for 
action •••• 12 
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Our conclusion about the code-making process is this: It 
was too often marked by selfish log-rolling anQ wild, hasty 
compromises which were not likely to serve the good of anybody, 
much less the common good. The cause of this was partly the 
code-makers themselves, but mostly the extreme haste with 
which the codes were drawn up. What lessons do we learn there-
fore from this aspect of NRA? The code-makers of our future i-
deal Industrial Democracy must be much more representative of 
Labor, must make public adequate and scientific statistics, 
must make their cocies .Y!!!£h more slowly, must give much greater 
thought to the general social welfare outside of their own 
industrial group, must give more attention to long-term, as 
well as merely short-term economic effects. Of course, wherever 
there is law-making by divergent pressure groups there will be 
discord, log-rolling, lobbying, etc. In a word, there will 
12 Gen. Hugh Johnson, National Recovery Administration, Jan. 
25, 1934, address of Administrator. 
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always be "politics". But the excessively tempestuous and 
hasty law-making process under the NRA could surely be remedied 
in the future by taking the proper safeguards against it. This 
is a problem which the social planner must meet and solve in 
advance, being careful not to confuse remedies for emergencies 
with long-time reorganization of our social economy. 
A third question to be asked about the codes as legisla-
tion is this: What was the typical content of the codes? It 
will not be necessary to examine a large number of codes to 
determine this, for they all had many similarities. The Iron 
and Steel Code is sufficiently fundamental to be a type for 
the other codes. The Iron and Steel Code was simply a body of 
laws binding the members of the industry subject to the Code 
Authority.13 These laws declared their ovVfl purpose (Article II) 
who could be members of the Steel Code Group (Article III). 
They established very concrete and definite regulations about 
rates of pay, hours of labor and other conditions of employment, 
(Article IV). This article recognized labor's right to or-
ganize, condemned child labor (under sixteen) for the industry, 
set up geographical wage districts based on varying costs of 
living, set minimum rates of pay for common labor for those 
13 Lewis Mayers, "A Handbook of NRA", Federal Codes, Inc., 
New York City, 1934, 589 ff. 
• districts, (35 cents an hour, for ocample, in the Eastern Dis-
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trict), set maximum hours for the industry at 48 hours per 
week. Article V treated pro~uction and new capacity. It re-
fused to control or allocate the volume of production or sales 
among the members, believing that the elimination of unfair 
trade practices would eliminate any overproduction or in-
equitable distribution of production or sales. (It is impor-
tant to note here that we do not claim that all the provisions 
of the Iron and Steel Code were practically carried out, or 
in practice operated for the common good. We simply state 
what they intended to regulate and perform.) Article V forbade 
the members to expand their plants by new blast furnace, open 
hearth or Bessemer steel capacity, unless the Code should be 
amended to permit it. However this article did not seem to re-
strict unduly the changes and technological improvements of the 
Steel industry. No mention was made of new continuous strip 
mills, high grade electric furnaces, etc. Thus the Code seemed 
sufficiently flexible to admit of the inevitable improvements 
in processing. 
Article VI described and delimited the administration of 
the steel code. Article VII regulated prices and terms of 
payment: "None of the members of the Code shall make any sale 
of any product at a price or on terms and oonditions more 
favorable to the purchaser thereof than the price, terms or 
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• conditions established (by the Code.)" Thus this article set 
base prices, following the multiple basing point system. Artic~ 
VIII listed certain unfair practices, the performance of which 
would constitute a violation of the Code, (for example, 
bribes to purchasers). Article IX set up the maclunery to pro-
cure adequate reports and statistics for the inaustry. Article 
X treated the all-important subject of penalties and damages, 
and stated that "Any violation of any provision of the Code 
by any member of the Industry shall constitute a violation 
of the Code by such a member." For violation of the price 
laws, the penalty was a fine of $10.00 per ton of the products 
so sold. The other articles regulated general matters, ways 
of making amendments to the codes, ways to terminate the code, 
etc. 
Thus we see, in conclusion, what a typical body of NRA 
code law tried to do; namely, to regulate the hours, wages, 
prices, quality, etc., in the industry for the professedly 
maximum good of the labor, management, and consumers involved. 
All the codes in general attempted thiS, though the extent of 
the regulationary controls varied in different industries. 
Such a content would doubtless be the general content of any 
codes set up in our future Industrial Democracy. 
CHAPTER V.I 
VOCATIONAL GROUP ADMINISTRATION 
The problem of administration in self-governing industry 
under the NRA presented grave difficulties. We are concerned 
here not with the NRA staff administration problems primarily, 
but with the administration problems arising from the industrial 
code-groups themselves. We ask first: Who were the code ad-
ministrators under the NRA? Whom did they represent? How 
"representative" were they? How were they selected? What dif-
ficulties arose because of this set-up? What warnings does 
this set-up give us as to the planning of a future industrial 
democracy? 
The Administrators in each code-industry were the "Code 
Authorityff, set up to administer the code. In most cases, 
these code authorities were either composed of - or domina~ed 
by -the Trade Association of that industry.l A survery of 110 
codes (the first 100 plus 10 others) showed that in 63 codes, 
trade associations ran the show. Often these associations 
were simply and direct~ appointed by the code. 
The fact that in the remaining 47 codes explicit dominance 
was not given to a trade association, did not mean that 
associations did not get the dominance anyway_ Usually the 
1 Lyon, 206. 
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indicate. Its character is sharply seen in 
the more extreme proposal that code authori-
ties be composed equally of representatives 
of business interests, labor, and consumers, 
with a public chairman. This proposal sharply 
challenges the conception of "industrial 
self-government" which the present form of 
code authority supports. It presents the 
view that if industry is to be organized col-
lectively, it must be defined as including all 
the groups at interest, and not merely the 
single group concerned with making a pecun-
iary gain from industrial operations. There 
is great force in this contention. It rec-
ognizes what is true, that under the aggre-
gate terms of codes as they now (1934) exist 
there resides a considerable power to restrict 
the productivity of the economic system to 
the detriment of the population dependent 
thereon in their roles both as workers and 
consumers, so long as such powers exist. It 
is very difficult to defend the present basis 
of representation in the hands of the only 
persons to whose interest it may be to restrict 
productive activity. [Jtalics ours~ 2 
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Taking human nature as it is, it is not likely that justice 
will be done to the three groups, management, labor, consumers, 
when only one group has any real power in the administration 
of the codes, namely management. 
How did the Deputy Administrator fit into the picture of 
code administration personnel? Some deputy administrator sat 
in every code authority as evidence of NRA's supervisory 
responsibility. In view of the debarment of labor and consumer 
groups from any active part in code administration, the deputy 
2 Ibid., 213. 
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was in a highly crucial position. He was the only direct avenue 
through which the NRA followed up the performance of code au-
thorities and interpreted its policies to such code authorities. 
He was the outpost of Uncle Sam in the industrial groups, the 
eyes and ears of the government. He was supposed to guard 
against code administration slackness or abuse. He had a dual 
job - to protect basic NRA policies and to be umpire in the 
factional disputes of the code authorities themselves. He 
spent much of his time playing umpire. 
Actually what happened? The deputy administrator was too 
often poorly informed about the particular industry whose code 
'" he was supposed to be helping to administrate. LJ The reason 
for this was that the NRA was quite unable to secure the 
necessary large staff of trained administrators in so shurt a 
time. The result? The majority of code authorities operated 
with considerable independence from close NRA supervision - no 
doubt with too much independence. 
A typical example of code authority personnel may help to 
illustrate our subsequent conclusions. The Steel Industry un-
der the NRA had for its Code Authority the industry's trade 
aSSOCiation, the Iron and Steel Institute plus the Deputy 
3 Ibid., 136, n. 27. 
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Administrator. The Institute was composed of 32 directors and 
a chairman. 4 These men were in large part the president, Con-
gress and Supreme Court of the steel industry's "state" in the 
NRA industrial democracy. The Steel Code permitted 2000 members 
or "citizens", (actually there were a little more than 1000 
members) who were either individual business men or employees 
in the steel business or Corporations or Partnerships. Each 
member had one vote. In addition each member got more votes in 
proportion to his dollar volume of sales of steel. Thus the 
nine largest steel companies in the country controlled 52% of 
the vote of the Code Authority. The pow8rs of the Authority 
(which were legal, judicial and. executive) were to gather stat-
istics, rix damages for code violation, waive damages for code 
violation, interpret the code, allow deductions below the base 
prices for steel, set minimum freight charges, determine new 
unfair practices. The 03 directors were quite independent of 
the 1000 or so members. They needed the approval of the mem-
bers only for new amendments to the code. 
We may sum up NRA's warnings as to the personnel of Code 
Authorities as follows: If trade associations are to play an 
important role in the forming of a future industrial democracy, 
4 Carroll R. Daugherty, Melvin G. de Chazeau, Samuel S. 
Stratton. "The Economics of the Iron and Steel Industry", 
McGraw-Hill, New York City, 1937, I, 221. 
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better provision must be made for non-association members of an 
industry. Consumer interests on the code authority must be 
better represented - doubtless through the deputy administrator. 
While we must avoid the tianger of too dominant government sup-
ervision of the various code authorities, still better super-
vision will be necessary than was had under the NRA. This 
could be had by insisting on better, and less hastily, trained 
deputy administrators. Lastly, and most important of all, ade-
quate labor participation in the code authorities is surely a 
necessary condition for the success of any future industrial 
democracy. Mere advisory staffs will not be enough. Labor 
must have a voting power on each coae authority. The details 
of code authority structure vvill (and doubtless should) vary 
from industry to industry, but we believe that the above warn-
ings from the NRA experiment in industrial democracy must be 
heeded if any true system of industrial democracy is to succeed 
in the future. 
The administrative problem of vocational group government 
has another aspect; namely, how did the administrators admin-
istrate? How were the code laws of the NRA experiment in In-
dustrial Democracy actually executed? What warnings does such 
execution give us for the future? Code administration involved 
many difficulties, but the most important of these was the 
great difficulty of getting code violators to comply with the 
code. We have much to learn from the compliance problem. 
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How was compliance effected under the NRA? In most cases, 
violators of codes were handled not by the various code authori-
ties but by the compliance division of the NRA staff itself. 
This staff was highly decentralized into regional and state 
offices. Only a small residue of complaints reached the -fiash-
ington COllipliance Division. The NRA had no airect powers of 
enforcement. It had only indirect powers such as removal of 
the Blue Eagle and the threat of prosecution. The Legal Divi-
sion of the NRA staff prepared cases against code violators for 
the Federal Courts. However it could not actually prosecute; 
this could be done only by the various district attorneys of 
the Department of Justice. This whole machinery was rather 
cumbrous technically and rather delicate in human relationships. 
The experience of the NRA compliance agencies demonstrated 
that the compliance problem was almost wholly a problem of the 
non-compliance of small business units. 5 Compliance was poor-
est under the codes whose constituent businesses were quite 
small, and also among the little fellows in the big code groups. 
There was almost no compliance problem among large manufactur-
ing enterprises except for some minor technical violations. 
Compliance was also bad in economically backward regions such 
as the Ozarks where, for instance, it was almost impossible to 
enforce the canning code. 
5 Lyon, 260. 
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Why did the NRA experiment fail to enforce its law~? In 
the first place the philosophy of NRA was that the various in-
dustrial code groups should attain some real self-government-
that these authorities would handle their own complaints and 
see to the enforcement of tl1eir own codes (short of actual fed-
eral prosecution, of course.) Thus the government's police 
work was to be secondary and mainly temporary. As a matter of 
cold fact, however, the code authorities were not equipped to 
effect compliance; nor did they do so. The result was that the 
job fell to the compliance division of the NRA staff. Now this 
staff was greatly undermanned. Not only was it unable to go 
out actively and check on the observance of codes by business, 
but it was unable (even by sitting passively in its offices) 
to handle the flood of complaints on non-compliance coming in 
to it from business and labor. The result? Flagrant viola-
tions of code laws everywhere. It was an embarrassing situa-
tion to be irl, and a demoralizing one. 6 
For a future industrial democracy a very large number of 
observers (or "inspectors" or "policemenfl ) will be necessary 
to check on business and labor and to gather evidence on com-
pliance. Should these inspectors be part of a U.S. Government 
staff, or should they be subject to each Code Authority? We 
believe that the inspection and complaints side of effecting 
6 Ibid., 272. 
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compliance should be handled entirely by the Code Authorities 
who best y~OW their O\Vll peculiar problems. We also believe that 
the vocational groups should have the power, as far as possible, 
to enforce their own laws by their own complaints departments, 
fines, etc. of course their decisions would be subject to ap-
peal to the U.S. Courts. 
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in an orderly, democractic way. Thus we see that in tJ,lls re-
gard, the Pope's Plan is eminently practical; it builds on ex-
isting economic conditions. 
2) Since there is basic unity within a given business 
firm, it is important that organized labor be given fair re-
presentation and some voting po,'ier as to the management of that 
firm. Is this practicable? There will be huge opposition 
from some businessmen, of course. Yet surely it can be shown 
to businessmen that they can profit in the long run if a fair 
share in management be given to organized labor. In fact there 
are many cases touay in which orbanized labor has much to say 
about management, affecting not only wages and hours but pro-
duction-conditions and prices. These cases prove that such a 
system can be oPerated successfully and peacefully. Since there 
is a unity of interest, there ~ be peaceful co-operation. 
Both employers and employees recognize the bond uniting them 
into a lil" tIe IT societylT • Each group mus t recognize the bther' s 
right to a voice in settling their common economic problems. 
Both groups must be willing to make concessions. Where these 
conditions have been given a fair trial such co-operation has 
worked in American business. It is not a mere dream; it is a 
fact. 
3) We should also recognize the basic unity which actually 
does exist within American industrial groups, at least in the 
basic industries. Our business firms do fall fairly -iiTell into 
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na.turally unified "vocational groups". The NRA experiment dem-
onstrated this unity. The fact that economic prosperity varies 
El £roups demonstrates it. The fact that business firms are 
mutually interdependent within the groups demonstrates it. A 
ma.jor element of the Pope's Plan is that it builds upon voca-
tional group unity. But this unity already exists in American 
economic life, as we have said, at least in the basic indus-
tries. We need only recognize it, use it, build upon it. Thus 
we see that the underlying conditions presupposed by the Pope'S 
Plan are verified in the United states. 
4) That vocational group unity be best expressed, the 
number of groups must be Jept at a minimum and should be far 
less than the 750 co de groups which existed under the NRA. It 
should be possible to keep the number from swelling beyond all 
control if industrial democracy is begun slowly and in the 
basic industiies first. 
5) However, in spite of the natural unity which exists 
within our various industrial groups, there will always remain 
the problem of preventing excessive overlapping of the groups 
and the resulting jurisdictional conflicts. This problem will 
not be severe in the basic industries. Such industries are 
the fuel industries: coal, oil, power; the raw-materials in-
dustries: iron, steel, aluminum, rubber, chemicals; the dur-
able goods industries: autos, clothing; the foods industries: 
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canners, packers~ the large wholesaling industries. Industrial 
Democracy should be begun in these large basic industries first. 
Let the small manufacturer of unusual pro~ucts and the retail 
trade be organized later. Of course a workable compromise will 
have to be set up between vertical coce groups and horizontal, 
between circular (many-product) groups and straight-line (one-
product) groups. And the multiple coverage of one business 
firm by many code groups will have to be eliminated. 
~e suggest that if a firm finds it may be covered by sever-
al different code groups, it should have the option of choosing 
whatever group it wants. Such freedom seems essential if the 
system is to be truly democratic. If tillS freddom means that 
many firms will take the line of least resistance and affili-
ate themselves witll groups willch favor stockholders to the 
detriment of labor and consumers, then some standards of choice 
can be established within which the freedom will operate. 
However, this freedom of choice should be safeguarded. It is 
true that the whole problem of overlapping is difficult. But 
surely it can be solved in a practical way, if the Pope's Plan 
is begun first in the rather homogeneous basic industries. 
6) The series of ch~nges leading to Industrial Democracy 
must be evolutionary and not revolutionary as they were under 
the NRA. Probably the changes in our basic industries during 
the last fifty years have rendered those industries fit to 
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receive some sort of industrial democracy almost at once. But 
that our total American economy should be transformed into a 
working industrial democracy overnight or even within a few 
years seems to be utterly impracticable. However when the 
basic industries are operating successfully on a vocational ba-
sis, they will offer a powerful incentive to the rest of busi-
ness to follow suit. 
Evolutionary change means first that we should not cast 
aside our existing labor organizations as outmoded or inade-
quate, but we should refashion them towards the lines of In-
dustrial Democracy. The CIO, for example, being an association 
of industrial unions, has alreaQy begun to shape labor's role 
for industrial democra~y. In fact the CIO has already become 
"vocational group conscious", as is indicated by the nIndustry 
Councils Plann of its president, Mr. Philip Murray. The Catho-
lic social planner can, and should, use the CIO. He should try 
to impregnate it with the ideals and principles of the Pope's 
Plan. The AFL, being an association of craft and trade unions, 
can also help the Catholic social planner. It is true that the 
AFL will be less useful than the CIO in helping to organize the 
basic industries vocationally. But the AFL may be very useful 
later on in helping to sprtjad Industrial Democracy beyond the 
basic industries to the·rnore independent trades and crafts. 
Thus we see that from the point of view of labor organization, 
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the Pope's Plan seems eminently feasible in the United States. 
We must also use, as far' as pOSSible, our existing manage-
ment agencies and trade associations. We must try to reshape 
them for their important part in Industrial Democracy. Is this 
possible? It is, if the proper education and incentives be 
given to the management class. Much opposition will undoubtedly 
come from this class. However a philosophy of social respon-
sibility is growing among business managers. There are hopeful 
signs that businessmen might welcome industrial democracy es-
pecially since it is an alternative to burocratic federal con-
trol of our economic life. 
Lastly, evolutionary change means th~t in the actual forma-
tion of the vocational groups, their code-laws must not be drawn 
up in the hectic haste of a few months by "log-rolling" and 
extravagant compromises designed to get the code established 
rather than to serve the common good. Years may be necessary 
between first code-law negotiations and final ratification. 
Attention must be given to long-term as vvell as to short-term 
economic effects. 
7) There should be every allowance for flexibility of 
organizational framework and law content among the various vo-
cational groups. What is good for one group, the Coal Mining 
Group, for example, may not be suited at all for another group, 
such as the Automobile Group. Furthermore, all the groups 
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411 should be flexible enough to handle technological progress and 
inventions smoothly. Flexibility can be made feasible, we be-
lieve, if sufficient self-determination is given to the groups, 
and if fair representation is given to labor, management and 
the U. s. GoverI1ll1ent to determine policies ,;vi thin and between 
the various groups. 
8) The initiative towards Industrial Democracy should 
come "from belowtt, from managemeont ana. .Labor as much as poss1b.le, 
and not "from above", from Washington. Of course an act of 
Congress will be necessary ultimately to put industrial demo-
cracy into effect. But this act should be persuasive rather 
than coercive legislation. Moreover, in order that laws passed 
under the authority of this act be constitutional, they should 
be approved by Congress. 
9) The various vocational group administrators must be 
both unprejudiced men and yet intimately familiar with all the 
conditions of their respective groups. It sel::;ms quite possible 
to secure an adequate number of such men, especially if the 
industrial democracy idea grows SIOVlly. No doubt many of them 
could be secured from the many WaShington bureaus, as, so we 
hope, those bureaus are gradually dissolved. 
10) Prosecution and trial of code-law violators should 
be handled as far as possible by the vocational groups them-
selves, with appeal, if necessary, to the U.S. Department of 
Justice and the U.S. Courts. 
94 
., 
Inspectors, "policemen", and com-
plaints-adjusters should doubtless be subject directly to the 
various Vocational Group Authorities. The problem of getting 
small, scattered businesses to comply with the code will surely 
be grave. But once again, if Industrial Democracy is begun 
gradually, and first in the basic industries, this problem of 
effecting compliance will not be an immediate one. For in the 
basic industries at least, compliance can be rather readily se-
cured. 
It will not be easy for the Catholic social planner to 
work out all these problems and suggestions presented by the 
NRA experiment. However they are not insoluble. Hence we are 
convinced that the Pope's Plan can be practically worked out 
for the United states. We are not over enthusiastic. Education 
is necessary; research is necessary. Above all, a better ob-
servance of the moral law by lllore of our citizens is necessary_ 
But with time and work and gradual change, we believe Indus-
trial Democracy can be woven into American life. It will not 
solve all our economic problems of price control, monopoly, and 
so forth,automatically. Rather it will merely provide the or-
ganizational machinery to solve those problems. But such a 
machinery is surely the only machinery which can do the job. 
It is the reasonable, middle ground machinery between the 
burocracy of state socialism and the old cutthroat individual-
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ism of "laissez-faire". In the vocational group system our 
social order may be expected to find stability at last. It is 




Beard, Charles A., and Mary R., "America in Midpassage", Mac-
millan, New York City, 1939. 
Bruehl, Charles, "The Pope's Plan", Devin Adair, New York 
City, 1939. 
Daugherty, Carroll R., and de Chazeau, Melvin G., and Stratton, 
Samuel S., "The Economics of the Iron and Steel In-
dustry", MCGraw-Hill, New York City, 1937. 
Dearing, Charles, etc., "The ABC of the NRA", The Brookings 
Institution, Washington, D.C., 1934. 
Golden, Clinton and Ruttenberg, Harold, I1The Dynamics of Indus-
trial Democracy", Harper, New York City, 1942. 
Hacker, Louis M., !fA Short History of the New Deal", Crofts, 
New York City, 1934. 
Johnson, Gen. Hugh, "The Blue Eagle From Egg to Earth", Double-
day Doran, Garden City, N.Y., 1935. 
Lyon, Homan, Terborgh, Lorwin, Dearing, Marshall, "The National 
Recovery Administration", The Brookings Institution, 
Washington, D.C., 1935. 
Mayers, Lewis, "A Handbook of NRA", Federal Codes, Inc., New 
York City, 1934. 
Munro, William Bennett, "The Government of the United states", 
Macmillan, New York City, 1928. 
von Nell-Bruening, S.J., Oswald, "Reorganization of Social 
Economy", transl. by Rev. Bernard W. Dempsey, S.J., 
Bruce, Milwaukee, 1936. 
Semaines Sociales de France, "L'Organisation Corporative n, 
J. Gabalda et Cie., Paris, 1935. 
Tead, Ordway, ttNevi Adventures in DemocracylT, Vlhittlesey House, 
McGraw-Hill, New York City, 1939. 
97 
,.; 
Trehey, Rev. Harold F., "Foundations of a Modern Guild System", 
Catholic University Press, Washington, D.C., 1941. 
pamphlets and Periodicals 
Archbishops and Bishops of Administrative Board of National 
Catholic Welfare Conference, ffThe Church and Social 
Ordern, NeWC, ivashington, D.C., 1940. 
Dempsey, S.J., Rev. Bernard W., "Corporate Democracy", Central 
Bureau Press, st. Louis, 1941. 
Nathan, otto, "The NIRA Cind Stabilization", American Economic 
Review, March, 1935. 
Parsons, S.J., Rev. Wilfrid, "Blueprint for Catholics for 1943" 
America, Jan. 2, 1943. 
Parsons, S.J., Rev. Vlilfrid, "What are Vocational Groups?", 
Thought, Fordham Press, New York City, sept. 1942. 
pope Pius XI, "Atheistic Communism", ~ivini Redemptoris"), 
Paulist Press, New York City, 1937. 
The Wage Earner, "Economic Democracy", Association of Catholic 
Trade Unionists, Detroit, July 7, 1944. 
Vignaux, Paul, "Corporatism in Europe", Review of Politics, 
University of Notre Dame, April and July, 1942, 
194, 303. 
